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Abstract: 
In recent years co-management has been widely used as a strategy to address the challenges 
related to protected area governance, and devolution of power, management responsibility and 
empowerment of actors are recognized as central to this approach.  This study examines the 
extent to which present co-management arrangements in Rema-Kalenga Wildlife Sanctuary 
(RKWS), Bangladesh has achieved devolution of power, responsibility and resource use rights 
and what are the prevailing gaps between policy and practice. Lockwood’s good governance 
principles and Agrawal and Ribot’s power decentralization framework were adopted to analyse 
the governance reform process and present mechanism of power sharing at study site.  Our 
findings reveals that, co-management program has been helpful in advancing forest 
conservation goals, reducing corruptions, creating social networks, changing the attitude of 
stakeholders and minimizing resource related conflicts. But unlike many cases around the 
world, outcomes of this decentralization process have not been systematically positive with 
regard to devolution of power and management responsibility from state to local co-
management organizations. Additionally, this process is struggling to offer a meaningful 
reciprocal partnership between state and local community due to unequal power relations and 
top-down accountability mechanisms. Legislative and executive powers are still withheld by 
the state and important controls over decision making process were retained by government 
agencies. There is no proper arrangement regarding the sharing of benefits arising from co-
management and this governance reform has failed to have a significant impact on the socio-
economic development of the local communities. This paper concludes by pointing out that 
though co-management has showed its potential for solving some of the pressing contemporary 
forest governance challenges of Bangladesh, it is still operating as like a foster child of 
government without any legal policy backup and state’s support which has limited the 
devolution process and its outcomes. It is recommended that, policy interventions, capacity 
building of local actors, identifying context specific enabling conditions, enhancing downward 
accountability, and a shift from centralized regulatory frameworks are required for ensuring 
equitable and democratic power sharing process. 
Keywords: Co-management, Power devolution, Partnerships, Accountability, Actors 
Capability. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1: Background: Rapid loss of biodiversity and the continuous destruction and degradation 
of natural resources have become an issue of global concern in recent times (Masozera and 
Ralavalapati, 2004). This problem has been further intensified due to the lack of understanding 
about the complex nature of social-ecological systems and states’ inherited intention to manage 
the natural resources with centralized governance approach. Thus, the last two decades have 
witnessed a wave of decentralization reforms in the arena of natural resource governance 
(Shackleton et al., 2002). Consequently, a wide range of institutional arrangements have been 
developed and several attempts have been made so far to address the issue of conservation 
dilemmas and conflicting relationships between state and local community. Amongst these, co-
management has emerged as an internationally acclaimed way to deal with the challenges of 
governing natural resources (Matose, 2006). The key assumption behind co-management is 
that, this governance system will provide a sense of shared ownership and responsibility for 
managing natural resources (Brown et al., 2007) by incorporating conservation goals with the 
livelihood interests of multiple local stakeholders (De Pourcq, 2015).  
Consequently, different types of co-management arrangement has been developed by different 
scholars based on the levels of participation and extent of power and management 
responsibility transferred from state or central government to community based organization 
or local actors (Be ́ne ́ et al, 2006; Berkes, 2010). Actually, there is no universally accepted 
single fit definition of co-management applicable to diverse social-ecological systems and 
literature on co-management provides a wide range of definitions (Carlsson and Berkes, 2005). 
For instance according to World Bank (1999), co-management is a decentralized approach to 
decision making which provide equal ground for sharing rights, responsibilities and duties 
between local communities and nation state. On the other hand Sen and Nielsen (1996), 
described co-management as a process of integrating local knowledge with centralized 
management system and this joint decision making process covers various partnership 
arrangements based on the level of power sharing and degree of participation. Most widely 
accepted definition of co-management is shared by Borrini-Feyerabend  et al.,  (2000), who 
define  co-management as a situation in which two or more social  actors  negotiate,  define,  
and  agree  amongst  themselves  to  equitably  share  the  management  functions, entitlements, 
and responsibilities for a given territory or set of natural resources.  In summary, co-
management is considered as a pluralistic governance system (Nielsen et el, 2004) which 
sought to create a meaningful partnership arrangements through sharing power (Berkes, 2007; 
2 
 
Borrini-Feyerabend et el 2000); management responsibilities and authorities (Berkes, 2010) 
between local people and government. Devolution of power from central authority to local 
community institutions, improving the capability of actors (Shackleton et el, 2002) and 
ensuring downward accountability of state agency and co-management organisations (Agrawal 
& Ribot, 1999) are thus central to co-management process (Rashid et al, 2015).  
This decentralization process, initially started in developed countries and then it showed a rapid 
spread and was widely adopted in developing countries at the end of late 90’s (Bene et al, 
2009). Then, co-management has become progressively prevalent in the national and 
international policy discourse but various recent studies have shown that it has not lived up to 
expectation and the reality rarely reflects the rhetoric (Shackleton et el, 2002). Though this 
governance reform aimed to restructure the unequal power relation between state and 
communities through the transfer of management power and responsibilities and increasing 
downward accountability, empirical evidence suggests mixed results about its success (Bene 
et el, 2009).  Some studies have shown that co-management projects have been successful at 
integrating both forest conservations and livelihoods goals of the rural community (Gautam et 
al., 2004; Yadav et al., 2003) and reducing conflict at grassroots level (De Pourcq et el, 2015). 
Whereas, a large body of research argue that outcomes of the reform have not been 
systematically positive (Bene et el, 2009) since elite capture, unequal power relations, partial 
improvement of rural livelihood and welfare etc were in the lime light (Njaya et el, 2012). Thus 
in many cases co-management has resulted in limited participation and an inability to exercise 
authoritative power (Ho et el, 2015), failed to offer meaningful partnership arrangements 
(Matose, 2006), yielded limited benefits for local people and weakened local institutions 
(Shackleton et al. 2002).  
Similarly, Ribot et el., (2006) concluded that, in many cases decentralization reforms resulted 
in state recentralization because central governments tend to create obstacles for the local 
institutions by limiting the kinds of decision making powers that are transferred. Recent 
experiences in India and some African countries also found that, there is a lack of supportive 
legislation, guidelines and regulatory framework that is required for successful decentralization 
process (Meynen and Doornbos, 2002). Moreover, lack of necessary institutional arrangements 
and downwardly accountable representative authorities have also created barrier for the desired 
outcomes (Ribot et el, 2006) and in many cases co-management approaches have failed to 
improve governance (Bene et el, 2009). Furthermore, the discussion on governance reform 
process also highlights that, decentralization in natural resource management is not likely to 
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succeed and bring positive outcomes until a set of organizational and social conditions are met 
(Meynen and Doornbos, 2004 ; Bene and Neiland, 2006). Various study emphasize that, in 
order to improve the governance through co-management arrangements, lower level 
bureaucracies such as local actors and co-management organizations should be empowered 
with legitimate authority and adequate capacity to execute or implement the decision they have 
been entitled to do, as well as they must get sufficient financial support from revenue sharing 
process (Meynen and Doornbos, 2004). Thus, the advocates of decentralized NRM emphasized 
that, for analysing governance reform process it is critical to  understand policy framework 
(how forest policy is formulated), the power issues especially the exercise of power, practices 
on the ground, and implementation process of the co-management project (Springate-Baginski 
and Blaikie, 2007). 
Moreover, co-management is a form of multi-level governance because multiple actors engage 
and share management power and responsibility at different territorial levels under co-
management regime (Nayak and Berkes, 2008). Thus, the notion of co-management needs to 
understand from the embedded power relations amongst different actors in a governance 
system by taking into consideration the complex socio-political dynamics of state –community 
relations (Matose, 2006).  Various recent studies have also stressed out the importance of 
evaluating natural resource governance reform processes based on the key principles of good 
governance such as Participation, Transparency, Accountability (Davis et el, 2006) as well as 
from the  standpoint of power relationships (Njaya et al, 2012 and Ho et el, 2015).  Actually, 
in the early analysis, degree of participation and level of power sharing was considered as key 
explanatory variable for evaluating the success or failure of decentralization process (Bene et 
al., 2008). But in recent times, various researchers concluded that, types of actor, mechanism 
of downward accountability, kinds of participation as well as supportive legislation and benefit 
sharing mechanism are equally important for evaluating the governance reform process.  
Because, alike degree of participation, the transfer of power to accountable and representative 
local institutions is a necessary element of effective decentralization (Bene and Neiland, 2006). 
So, analysing the dynamics of power relation especially the types and distribution of power 
among various actors as well as accountability mechanisms are therefore critical for 
understanding the devolution process.  
Under the context of the emergence of new modes of governance, this study aims to examine 
the present power dynamics of co-management governance reform in a protected area of 
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Bangladesh in order to understand whether decentralized management has resulted in better 
governance outcomes or not, what are the challenges for its implementation and what can be 
done to improve the effectiveness. 
1.2: Context of Co-management in Bangladesh. 
Like other developing  countries in the tropics (where majority of the rural community depends 
on forest), Bangladesh has also been experienced a historic conflict between state and 
community regarding forest governance (Mukul et el, 2012) and reconciling conservation goals 
with local livelihoods interests was really a challenging task for Bangladesh.  Because, current 
forest management policy has failed to improve the governance (Mukul et al., 2012) and in 
many cases unsuitable to secure active participation of local people. Moreover, state controlled 
traditional top-down governance approach and ineffective management practices have resulted 
in the further degradation and destruction of protected area resources of Bangladesh (Aziz, 
2008). Therefore, after several decades of  strong centralized management practices co-
management system was initiated in Bangladesh’s protected areas in 2004 (Rashid et al, 2014; 
Chowdhury et al., 2011) with the help of development partners with a view to  improve 
conservation outcomes by giving local communities a central role in the management of natural 
resources (IPAC, 2013). As Nielsen et al., (2004) stated that co-management approaches are 
designed to devolve power, authority and aims at empowering local communities to make 
forest management and utilization decisions jointly. Thus, Mukul and Quazi (2009), suggested 
that, shared governance through co-management system can be used as a crucial strategy to 
conserve degrading forests and biodiversity of Bangladesh by providing support for local 
livelihoods.  Study conducted in few protected areas of Bangladesh have reported some 
positive outcomes initially in terms of the improvement of socio-economic condition of the 
forest user groups (FUG) members  (Mukul et al., 2012) and perceived increase of skills, 
decision-making power and social respect of the participants (IPAC, 2013). On the contrary, 
several studies concludes that despite of its high expectation and promises, co-management in 
Bangladesh has been struggling to deliver expected outcomes. Though the central government 
of Bangladesh has, in recent years realized the importance of people’s participation in forest 
management and initiated decentralization of NRM through co-management projects, but there 
is no notable progress has been made to restructure the institutional arrangements and policy 
framework in favour of decentralization. For example, Haque (2012), claims that with few 
exceptions to date protected areas and reserved forests reside largely on paper, not in practice. 
Study conducted by IPAC (2013) also concluded that in Bangladesh, co-management model 
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remains highly protectionist and Rashid et al., (2014) stated that good governance is often 
found missing and a top-down dominant approach still persists.  
1.3: Rationale of the Study 
Natural resource governance focuses on the relationship among structures, processes, traditions 
and institutions which determine how participation occurs, who makes key decisions, how 
authoritative power is transferred and exercised, how the responsibilities and how benefits are 
distributed among stakeholders (Graham et al., 2003). According to UNESCAP (2007), 
governance is the process by which decisions are made, norms or regulations are produced and 
actions are carried out. Various studies have shown that, conventional governance system of 
natural resources has been largely unsuccessful due to non-participatory development 
approaches (Dupar  and Barenoch  2002), centralized and top-down governance system, 
inadequacy of government agencies,  exclusion of local people in decision making process and 
has often led to increased degradation of natural resources. These factors have resulted in 
governance failure and urged for greater  involvement  of  the  local  communities  and  other 
stakeholders  in  the  management of natural resources (Ostrom 1990;  Mearns  1996;  Campbell  
et  al. 2002).   
Actually, co-management governance is expected to improve the management efficiency 
through creating partnership arrangements by involving wide range of actors in decision 
making process as well as altering unequal power relations by directing more power to local 
communities from state. But, forest governance reform through co-management system has 
faced many challenges in various part of the world. Because in practice devolution of power 
from state agencies to local authority is a complex multi-dimensional process (Bene et al., 
2008; Cronkleton et al, 2012). As a consequence, the potential for co-management approach to 
empowering the actors through restructuring the power relations, ensuring downward 
accountability and the effective involvement of actors in decision making process has recently 
come under widespread criticism (Bene et al. 2009).  
Though there is no universally agreed criteria or assessment tool to analyse the performance of 
co-management process but, Participation, Transparency, accountability, empowerment lie at 
the centre of contemporary discourses on NRM governance and these elements have in recent 
years been considered as the fundamental guiding principles for evaluating the success or 
failure of governance reform process (Bene and Neiland, 2006).  Moreover, in order to 
understand the process of decentralized forest governance, analysing the role of power 
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relationship is important because where there is ecological problems there is almost always a 
power struggle involved (Koot, 2016). Therefore, examining the context, especially how the 
transfer of various types of power among several actors are happening in practice, whether 
proper institutional arrangements are put in place, what are the mechanisms of accountability 
and how government is facilitating the process by enabling proper legislation and providing 
support for capacity building are necessary for understanding the effectiveness of decentralized 
governance process.  As various studies indicate that effective engagement of local actors in 
protected areas governance (Policy development, Planning and implementation) and ensuring 
the equal distribution of power, management responsibility and benefits among various actors 
still remains a challenging task in Bangladesh (Rashid et al., 2014; Chowdhury, 2008; DeCosse 
et al., 2012). Thus, there is a pressing need for careful re-assessment of rhetorical claims of 
government regarding the success of decentralization through co-management (CM) approach 
in the protected area management in Bangladesh. 
In Bangladesh, most of the research has been primarily focused on evaluating the effectiveness 
of co-management approach in relation to livelihood outcomes, conservation goals and 
community participation. Nonetheless, sharing of different types of power, multi-stakeholder 
engagement, empowerment of wide range of actors and increasing downward accountability 
are recognized as crucial dimensions and central aspect of co-management governance process 
(Ho et el. 2015, Davis et al, 2006, Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). Thus understanding the social-
ecological context and embedded power relations among various actors, the administrative 
framework through which CM plan or project is implemented, accountability mechanism 
(downward or upward), and the processes by which decision-making power and 
responsibilities are allocated amongst the different actors are considered as key factors which 
determine the potential advantages that could be gained from co-management system (Matose, 
2006, Bene et al, 2006, Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). But, it is indeed surprising that, very few 
empirical studies have been undertaken to systematically examine the power dynamics of co-
management (CM) process in the PA management of Bangladesh. So, there is a need to explore 
how co-management systems operate in practice especially from the perspective of power 
devolution and institutional transformation and what are the social-ecological factors affecting 
or contributing to the devolution process and its outcome. Thus, a qualitative research design 
was adopted to analyse the extent to which co-management approach has transferred decision 
making power and management responsibility to local actors, ensured accountability and 
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transparency, created a meaningful partnership between Forest Department (FD) and other 
stakeholders and what are the existing gaps between power in theory and power in practice. 
 
 
1.4: Objectives:   
The aim of my study is to critically examine the present mechanism of power sharing and 
institutional arrangement in collaborative management processes, especially, whether co-
management program has managed to achieve power devolution to some extent and how well 
is collaborative governance functioning in practice at Rema-Kalenga Wildlife Sanctuary.  
 
1.5: Research Questions:  
A. To what extent has co-management (CM) system transferred management and legal 
power to local level organizations and ensured the active participation of relevant 
stakeholders in decision making process? 
B. To what extent present institutional arrangements have increased accountability and 
transparency and created a meaningful partnership between forest department and local 
stakeholders? 
C. Do co-management organizations (CMOs)1 have the capacity to effectively deliver the 
expected outcome of the devolved governance process?  
D. What are the factors contributing to or affecting the successful devolution of co-
management governance? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 CMOs (Co-management Organisations): These are stakeholder groups or organisation elected by local 
people, particularly located in local area and covers a series of activities at community level. In the context of 
protected area governance in Bangladesh, CMOs are the main actors operating at the field level and working 
with forest department with the aim to improving forest governance through creating a partnership 
arrangements by sharing management responsibility and power.  
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Chapter Two: Literature Review, Conceptual and Theoretical Context of 
the Study 
 
This chapter reviews the literature on the issues of governance, decentralization process in 
Natural Resource Management, emergence of co-management approach as well as their 
relevance to Bangladesh. More explicitly this chapter highlights the contemporary theoretical 
and policy debates that have arisen in connection with the recent paradigm shifts of natural 
resource governance through decentralisation process and provides a concrete rational on how 
the analytical framework for this study is developed. This chapter is organised in six sections. 
The next section will provide a brief discussion regarding the debate associated with the 
concept “governance”, its importance in natural resource management and the principles and 
characteristics of good governance. Section, 2.2 will briefly present the process of governance 
reforms in the arena of natural resource management and types of decentralisation. The 
emergence of co-management approach as a as a way to promote good governance under 
decentralization regime and various types of co-management arrangements are explained in 
section 2.3. The theoretical framework of the study is shaped by the good governance principles 
and rooted in the framework provided by Agrawall and Ribot. Thus, section, 2.4 explains, 
Agrawal and Ribot’s  (1999)  framework  for  analyzing the process of  governance reform  
through co-management approach in Rema-Kalenga Wildlife Sanctuary (RKWS) in 
Bangladesh. Section, 2.5, discuss the legal, policy and administrative framework of protected 
area management through co-management approach in Bangladesh. Section 2.7 ends with 
describing the research design of the study.  
2.1: Concept of governance in Natural Resource Management (NRM):   
The term governance is now being increasingly used across many disciplines (Davis et al., 
2013) including in the arena of development studies and Natural Resource Management 
(NRM).  Researchers and development practitioners tend to analyse the success or failure of 
NRM related projects through the lens of this concept. Thus, a clear theoretical understanding 
regarding the concept of governance is necessary to analyse the forest governance process 
under decentralised regime. Despite its growing importance as an analytical tool, still there is 
a debate on how to define governance and asses its effectivity. Though various attempt has 
been made by wide range of scholars to clarify the term “Governance” but still it is an evolving 
concept and there is no simply or broadly accepted definition of governance (Davis et al., 
2013). Different authors have contextualised governance in different ways and according to 
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UNDP (1997, p2), “Governance  comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions  
through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet 
their  obligations and mediate their differences”. On the other hand, European commission 
(1995) defined governance as a continuous process of accommodating conflicting or diverse 
interests by taking collective action and enforcing compliance through formal institution while 
managing public affairs. Early definition of governance was mostly focused on the 
conventional process of creating norms, rules and institutions in order to manage public affairs 
but most recently focus has been shifted and governance has been highlighted with respect to 
power sharing, accountability, inclusiveness etc.  For example, Be ́ne ́and  Neiland (2006), 
defined governance as a democratic process of sharing responsibility and authoritative power 
among various stakeholders, formulations of rules or policy and implementing management 
actions.   
Like other sectors, fostering better governance is now considered as central to achieving 
sustainable forest management goals. With respect to natural resources, governance refers to 
the process of formulating formal rules, policy or laws that determines ownership and land use 
rights especially right to use, access and manage natural resources as well as how these rules 
are monitored and enforced; how the benefits are shared and how the systems of authority is  
legitimized (Mearns, 1996).  The notion of governance has been changing significantly and 
governance is now categorised as good or bad depending on the outcomes, effectiveness and 
perception of people (Davis et al., 2013).  Thus a new term good governance has emerged and 
being increasingly used by practitioners and policy makers in the domain of NRM and 
international development. Good governance is commonly perceived as a process of 
overcoming the shortcomings of weak governance and has the inherent ability to provide 
economic, social and environmental outcomes effectively (Davis et el, 2013). Conversely, 
weak or bad governance is defined as the process which has failed to achieve its objectives due 
to ineffective institutional framework, corruption, improper accountability mechanism, 
unequal distribution of power and authority etc (Owoye and Bissessar, 2012).  In the context 
of natural resources, the issues of bad governance is often associated with the lack of open and 
inclusive decision-making process, transparency and accountability as well as implies states 
inability to manage the resource effectively. Thus, bad governance is often regarded as the root 
cause for poor development outcomes and management failure such as natural resource 
depletion, illegal logging and corruption, marginalization and impoverishment of forest-
dependent communities etc. (Davis et el, 2013).  
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Many authors have criticised the concept good governance since it implies many different 
things in many different contexts (UNESCAP, 2009) and in reality it is difficult to achieve in 
its totality. On the contrary, some authors have argued that, though good governance has 
different contents and meaning depending on the socio-ecological and political context but the 
fundamentals principles that characterise “good governance” are mostly similar worldwide 
(Kaufmann et al., 2010; Cashore, 2009).  Good governance is associated with several widely 
accepted principles such as Transparency, accountability, public participation, legitimacy, 
empowerment, coordination, social justice, equity etc. Most recent definition of governance by 
Borrini-Feyerabend et al (2006) stated that “Governance is about power, transparency, 
accountability and legitimacy and the voice of actor’s in the decision-making process. 
Additionally, good governance is claimed to deliver intended project outcomes and improve 
the management effectiveness if the above mentioned set of principles are adopted and used as 
a guiding strategy in governance reform process. Thus, in recent years, focus has been shifted 
from conventional top-down authoritative governance system to more participatory, inclusive 
and pluralistic governance approach. Therefore, good governance is now considered as 
essential element for achieving development and conservation goals and being increasingly 
used  in the arena of natural resource management (NRM) in order to improve the management 
effectiveness (Bene, 2006, Rashid et al., 2016).  
2.2: Governance reform in natural resource management: The case of 
Decentralisation 
In recent years a new wave of governance reform has been promoted by international NGOs, 
donor organisations, national governments, civil society etc in the arena of NRM (Bene et al., 
2006) with the aim of producing positive social, economic and ecological outcomes (Carter & 
Grownow, 2005).  Thus a considerable restructuring of the institutional arrangements and 
policy frameworks have been done in order to promote more sustainable NRM practices 
through improved governance mechanisms Despite of several theoretical and policy debates 
on the issue of decentralized institutional arrangements, decentralization is now widely 
accepted as a new management paradigm (Bene et al., 2006) for promoting good governance 
in natural resource management (Davis et al., 2013).  
Consequently, during 1980s, a large number of programs and policy reforms were being carried 
out by donor agencies and NGOS in many developing countries, with the explicit objective to 
achieve sustainable use of natural resources through the ongoing process of decentralization 
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(Manor, 1999). Various types of institutional arrangements have been developed by various 
scholars and policy makers in order to improve effective and efficient management of NRM.  
Under the umbrella term decentralization, three types of governance reforms are being widely 
practiced in the domain of natural resource management such as: de-concentration, delegation 
and devolution (Table, 1). Thus, recognizing the clear distinction between these three different 
forms of decentralisation is therefore critical for understanding the issues related to governance 
reform process in forestry. 
Under the spectrum of decentralisation,   de-concentration refers to the process where power 
and management responsibility is transferred to the regional offices or lower-level units of 
bureaucracy or government body (for example: provincial or district level of the Department 
of Forestry) (Bene et al., 2006). Though deconcentrtion shifts the management responsibility 
to the regional offices of the same department but it is considered as the weakest form of 
governance reform because control over NRM and decision making power is still maintained 
by the central government (Smith 2001, UNDP 1999). On the other hand, delegation is 
considered as a higher form of decentralization because more decision making authority and 
responsibilities are shifted from central government or state (such as forest department) to 
autonomous or semi-independent local level organizations (e.g : local NGOS or community 
organisation) but overall accountability mechanism remains upward to central government 
(Smith 2001, UNDP 1999).  
 
Table 1: Types of decentralisation according to (Smith, 2001, p.17) 
Devolution refers to the transfer of authoritative power, rights and  responsibilities from the 
central government to local government or other designated independent organization such as 
representatives of user groups at the local level (fishers organizations, co-management 
organization etc) (Bene et al., 2006). Devolution is considered to be the highest form of 
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decentralization (Smith, 2001) since it provides high level of autonomy regarding decision 
making process and high level of accountability to local people (Table 1).  
Governance reforms in NRM sectors covers these three different types of decentralization (de-
concentration, delegation and devolution) and each of these types of arrangements provides 
different outcomes in relation to empowerment of actors and control over natural resources 
(Bene et al., 2008).  Therefore, various participatory governance reform projects have been 
initiated and implemented in the developing countries under the above mentioned spectrum of 
decentralization in order to facilitate people’s participation and improve the responsiveness of 
government practices in natural resource management.  
2.3: Emergence of co-management as a governance strategy under decentralisation 
reforms:  
Under this wave of decentralisation reforms many countries have moved away from centralised 
command and control system to a more participatory approach which requires the involvement 
of multiple stakeholders in forest management (Turyahabwe et al., 2012). This widespread 
promotion of participatory governance was sparked by the direct support of international donor 
agencies which has resulted in the changes to national legislation, policies, and institutional 
arrangements in support of decentralisation. Though participatory approaches encompasses a 
wide range of governance arrangements but the key concept of participatory forest 
management lies in the processes and mechanisms that empower local people to take part in 
the all aspects of decision-making process regarding forest resource management. The most 
important types of participatory forest management approaches are Joint Forest Management 
(JFM), Community Based Forest Management (CBFM) and Collaborative Forest Management 
(CFM). For example, under JFM approach communities are allowed to sign formal agreements 
with resource owners such as government or state agency regarding the management of forests 
through sharing the operational costs and benefits (Wily, 1998). On the contrary “community-
based natural resource management” exclusively based on the initiatives of user groups, where 
local communities have full control over management of the resources and the allocation of 
costs and benefits (Wily, 2002) as well as ownership and user rights over the forest resource 
also belong to the community.  Collaborative Forest Management (CFM) is the most widely 
used and adopted form of participatory forest management approach worldwide. There are 
several varieties of CFM and under this spectrum, co-management, in particular, has evolved 
as a more recognized approach of natural resource governance and widely promoted by 
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scholars and donors in developing countries (Ming’ate, 2012). Within the spectrum of 
decentralisation, several authors have tried to contextualise co-management based on the 
typology of participation and degree of power sharing.  Among these, one of the very first and 
most widely accepted typology co-management was proposed by Sen and Nilesen (1996).   
According to ‘Sen and Nilesen’ framework, co-management arrangements are categorised into 
five types such as: Intrusive, Consultative, Cooperative, Advisory, and Informative based on 
the level of participation of the actors in the decision making process and degrees of power 
sharing.  Under this continuum of collaborative arrangements, instructive management refers 
to the process of one way information flow or sharing from the government to natural resources 
users (e.g. fishers, forest users, etc.). In this process, local stakeholders are merely consulted 
by the government before regulations are introduced or formulated (Ming’ate, 2012). 
 
Figure 1: Co-management continuum (Sen and Nielsen 1996, p. 407)) 
However, consultative management, involves a two way information sharing process both from 
government or state to resource users or local community. Here government consults with 
resource user before forming any policy or law but the final decisions are taken by the state. 
Under this continuum, co-management is situated in the middle ground course (Pomeroy, 
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1997), where genuine partnerships are arranged between government and local community 
through sharing of decision making power, benefits and management tasks at all stages in the 
management process (Sen and Nielsen, 1996). Thus, the third type of management on the 
spectrum (cooperative approach under this spectrum) is referred as the ideal form of co-
management and fits with the notion of power devolution under the decentralization framework 
(Figure 1).   
The fourth and fifth types of management are totally opposite from instructive and consultative 
arrangements. For example, under the advisory arrangement, resource users act as a dominant 
decision making authority and can take decisions in prior consultation with government.  State 
or government agency mainly act as an advisor and merely approves or endorses the decisions. 
Under informative management, resource users have authoritative and decision making power 
to design, construct and implement regulations or laws (Pomeroy & Berkes, 1997). 
Government devolves the full management responsibility to the resource users and mainly 
provide necessary assistance or support when necessary. This is also called as community 
based natural resource management where social actors are in full charge of natural resource 
governance and according to Arnstein (1969), this stage is called citizen control which is the 
highest level of public participation.   Community forestry in Nepal is the example of this type 
of management where local communities receive the ownership and use rights, formulate laws 
or policies regarding and exclusively manage the forest resource (Lawrence, 2007) with limited 
assistance or advice from government. 
Co-management is a form of participatory management which integrates both the state and the 
community management and offers a wide range of partnership arrangements depending on 
the degrees of power sharing among multiple actors (Alpizar, 2006). Actually, institutional 
reforms through co-management process is aimed to improve forest governance as it involves 
bringing the central authority (for example: forest department or state) closer to the local 
community, in both the spatial and institutional senses by enabling actors’ empowerment and 
participation and promoting accountability and transparency  (Baumann, 2000).  However, key 
to all the definitions is that, in co-management, devolution of power, equitable sharing of 
management function, responsibility and benefits, active involvement of various actors in 
decision making process, creating meaningful partnership arrangements etc are considered as 
the salient dimension of co-management system. 
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As a consequence, co-management approach has been promoted by international donor 
organisation and widely practiced in India, Nepal, Philippines and Latin America (Ghate, 2003) 
as well as in many African countries like Tanzania, Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, 
Zimbabwe, Malawi, Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria, Gambia, Ghana, Mali and South Africa (Wily, 
2002) with the aim to improve natural resource governance. As we already discussed that forest 
governance reform under the wider trend of decentralisation process was aimed to ensure 
sustainable forest management through the implementation of good governance principles. Co-
management is believed to have the inherent potential to provide effective management 
solutions through embodying the key principles of good governance such as Participation, 
Transparency, Empowerment, and Accountability etc. in natural resource management (Borni-
feeyarabad et al., 2006).  
Though co-management has received widespread recognition as a way to promote good 
governance but study on the decentralisation reform process have highlighted serious 
limitations of CM arrangements. Amongst the wide range of collaborative projects 
implemented worldwide, Community based forest management in Nepal, Joint Forest 
management program in India, CFM in Uganda and some other African countries, co-
management program in Fisheries and forestry sector in Latin American and some Asian 
countries have been reported as the successful example of decentralization. In spite of having 
various positive aspects, literature on co-management also  found a  great  number  of  cases 
where decentralization reforms have failed to meet its explicit objectives and led to negative or 
devastating outcomes (Campbell  and  Shackleton  2002;  Ribot, 2002;  Dupar  and  Badenoch 
2002; Wily 2002). Some authors also argue that decentralisation is actually a distraction from 
the real power play on the forest land and in many cases it lead to a tightening of central control 
and hasn’t resulted in a real devolution of power (Springate-Baginski and Blaikie, 2007). 
2.4: Agrawal and Ribot’s (1999) decentralisation framework for analysing the 
process of devolution of governance through co-management approach:  
 
Ongoing global trends towards using devolution as a management strategy is a positive 
transitions from centralistic governance approach to a more collaborative arrangement of 
NRM. Thus, a wide range of analytical framework has been developed by various scholars with 
the aim to explaining forest governance reform process and asses the effectivity of forest co-
management program. Among the wide range of theories, Design principles and theory for 
common pool resources by Elinor Ostorm, Tragedy of the common by Hardin, Lockwood’s 
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good governance principles for protected area management, Agrawal and Ribot’s 
decentralization framework are considered as the most influential set of theories for analyzing 
decentralization process of natural resource governance.  
Active participation of various social actors in co-management program is believed to enhance 
the efficiency and equity in resource management (Castro & Nielsen, 2001). However, Béné 
and Neiland (2006), conducted a review of 50 case-studies of fisheries across 39 countries and 
conclude that degree of participation rarely explain the performance of the co-management 
system and the issue of how much power is shared may be the incorrect question. Instead, 
issues of how this power is shared among various actors and who receives this power (eg: local 
level elected organization or elite) is more crucial in governance reform process.  They 
emphasized that alike participation, accountability, transparency, empowerment and capability 
of actors are equally important for evaluating the process of co-management governance. 
Agrawal  and  Ribot (1999) support this argument and evidence from the decentralization 
process of  South Asia (e.g.: India and  Nepal)  and  West  Africa  (Senegal  and  Mali),  also 
demonstrated  that downward accountability and empowerment of actors through devolution 
of power and responsibility are fundamental element in decentralization processes.  
However, a number of recent studies have indicated that, central governments are not willing 
to share authoritative and managerial power with social actors which creates ambiguity 
regarding the implementation of the reform process (Davis et al., 2013).  Moreover, lack of 
compatible objectives and contrasted and opposed policy goals from state level agencies and 
community is recognized as another major obstacle which can accelerate existing resource 
related conflicts and power struggles among different state agency as well as within and 
between community groups at various levels (Be ́ne ́and Neiland, 2006). This strategy of state 
agencies to retain control over natural resources is also observed in many countries and Ribot 
et al., (2006) mentioned that, central governments intentionally limit the ability of local 
authorities to exercise power by either creating ambiguity in their reforms, or by exploiting 
ambiguities inherent in all policy measures.   For example, in respect of Malawi, Chinangwa, 
(2005) concludes that despite the official devolution discourse widely publicized, the paradigm 
of centralized management remains deeply embedded in the state agencies’ mentality. 
Actually, devolution requires transferring some of the power to local actors and state always 
feared a loss of control over planning and practice and try to recapture managerial power by 
controlling local governance (Pulhin and Dressler, 2009). 
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Thus, good governance is now considered as fundamental to achieving development and 
conservation goals in the arena of natural resource management (NRM) (Be ́ne ́ and Neiland, 
2006). As we discussed in previous section good forest governance is characterised by several 
principles and governance reform processes is aimed to increase the efficiency   of   resource   
management and provide equitable distribution of benefits. Therefore, improving forest 
governance and legislative framework has been the key central issue of international debate in 
recent years. UNESCAP (2007), has identified eight crucial elements of good governance and 
Lockwood (2010) identified seven principles and performance outcomes for good protected 
area governance. The principles that both UNESCAP (2007) and Lockwood (2010) have in 
common are Participation, Accountability, Transparency and Capability. These four key 
principles have in recent years emerged as universal criteria for successful decentralisation and 
are now being widely adopted and practiced for protected area (PA) governance and 
management (Institute on Governance, 2002). On the other hand, Agrawal and Ribot (1999) 
identify three principal elements of decentralization in forest management; these are: (1) 
Actors or Stakeholders (to whom the powers or responsibilities are transferred) (2) 
Empowerment (mostly focused on what types of power is being transferred: decision making 
or authoritative) and (3) Accountability (to whom the new institutions and actors are 
accountable).  
 
According to World Bank (2012), improving forest governance through decentralisation 
process must involves of all stakeholders in decision making, provide supportive forest policies 
and legislative framework, strengthen actors with adequate capacity and financial resources,  
create mechanisms  for  downward accountability, and ensure transparency in revenue sharing 
and allocation of management responsibility. The analytical framework for this study builds 
upon the key principles of good governance and Agrawal and Ribot’s (1999) three principle 
elements of decentralization framework was mainly used to assess whether decentralized 
management through co-management  has resulted in better forest governance and produce 
meaningful outcomes. In order to analyse all the research questions of our study, along with 
Agrawal and Ribot’s (1999) principles we also pay attention to two other important dimension 
of good governance such “Participation” and “Transparency”. So, in our study we mainly focus 
on the following principles and characteristics such as:  Participation, Actors, Empowerment 
(It includes power sharing and Capability) and Accountability and Transparency for 
analysing the process of power devolution and governance reform through co-management 
(CM) at Rema-Kalenga Wildlife Sanctuary.  
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2.4.1: Principle Elements of decentralised forest governance:  
 
2.4.1.1 : Actors:  Co-management involves diverse range of actors from various stakeholders 
group in decision making and power sharing process. These actors holds different social 
position, ideology, wealth, interests and expectations. In the co-management governance, these 
actors include forest department personnel, local government agencies, resource users group, 
local elite, civil society members etc. Actors are positioned at different levels of social action, 
and decentralization is about bringing changes in how actors at different levels of political 
authority exercise their power. In decentralisation process, a wide range of stakeholders and 
institutions shape decisions about how forests are managed and governed (Davis et el, 2013). 
Thus, the same types of power devolved to different actors will lead to variations in outcomes 
(Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). For example, Meynen and Doornbos (2004), concluded that in 
various states of India, decentralization of  NRM initiatives has failed to fulfil the expectation 
due to transfer of power to non-representative bodies such as  local politician and  traditional 
leaders. Thus, the type of local actors who gains power and the kind of power local actors gain 
determines the outcome of governance reforms (Ribot, 2003). Because devolving powers to 
elite or influential actors rather  than  elected user groups  may increase the risk  of 
strengthening  their  autocracy (Fisher  1997; Shackleton  and  Campbell,  2001) and  limits the 
scope of community representation in decision making process (Ribot, 2003).  So, identifying 
the relevant actors and what kind of power they should be endowed with is necessary to analyse 
the dynamics of complex power relation in environmental governance. 
 
2.4.1.2: Participation: The meaning of participation varies with context and situation but the 
key to all definition is the active involvement of relevant stakeholders in planning, design, and 
implementation of management decision. Participation is actually a process through which 
marginalised community is empowered to have a voice in the overall decision making process 
and ability to influence the outcome. It is now a potential element for most environmental 
decisions as it brings greater understanding and coordination between government and non-
government actors (Rashid et el, 2014). Participation by both men and women is a key 
cornerstone of good governance. Participation could be either direct or through legitimate 
intermediate institutions or representatives (UNESCAP, 2007). In our case participation in co-
management process implies involvement of stakeholders in forest management activities, 
decision-making and benefit sharing process.  
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2..4.1.3: Empowerment:  Synthesizing the literature on governance reform process reveals 
that, co-management approaches aim to developing partnership arrangements between state 
and communities through empowering local  communities (Bene  et al.,  2009; Nielsen  et al.,  
2004) , involving of wider group of actors in all stages of decision making, and facilitating  
equity in  benefit  sharing process  (Coulabaly-Lingani  et  al.,  2011). Thus, within co-
management governance system local actors are expected to gain decision making power and 
play a greater role in managing forest resources. In the context of natural resource governance, 
empowerment is referred as the ability of actors or institutions to positively influence the 
decision making process, course of actions, benefits sharing mechanism and outcomes of co-
management arrangements (Ming’ate, 2012). Thus, decentralisation through co-management 
approach is aim to empower local actors by having more control over resource utilisation and 
benefit sharing mechanism, policy formations and overall resource management decisions 
(Bene et al., 2009).  
 
According to (Mahonge 2010, p.33), ¨Empowerment and Co-management are interdependent 
and reinforce each other¨.  Hence, for  effective devolution, communities or local actors need 
to attain decision making power and  state or central agency should devolve power on 
management and utilization to  local  actors  that  are  accountable  to  local communities 
(Bergh,  2004). As Agrawal and Ribot (1999) concluded devolution as the highest form of 
decentralisation because it can provide the greatest benefits to communities and empower them 
to actively participation in decision making process.  Forest  co-management  approaches  is 
therefore  assumed to have the potential to achieve devolution as  it involves the transfer  of 
decision making powers and management responsibilities to co-management organisations  or 
local institutions which are downwardly accountable  to  local  citizens  through  electoral  
processes  (Agrawal  and  Ribot 1999; Larson, 2005;  Pomeroy  et al., 2001). Moreover, co-
management reconcile the conservation goals set by government with the social needs of local 
community through creating partnership and  providing   actors  with  the  legal  and  political  
authority  needed  to  enforce  rules, manage forests and utilize benefits  (Nielsen et al., 2004). 
Thus, empowerment of actors is considered as a key element of community-based management 
approaches and sharing management responsibility and authority is central to the 
decentralisation process (Bene et al., 2009).  
Empowerment through transferring of power and management responsibility under rapidly 
changing complex social-ecological systems is really a challenging task (Mahonge, 2010) and 
limited by various factors. For example, Brett (2000), concluded that, in various countries 
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control over decision making process and empowerment of actors through transfer of power is 
severely constrained by government. Because right to participation doesn’t always imply a 
right to determine outcomes (Brett, 2000) unless the local communities, decision making power 
and control over the use of natural resources and management rights are legally secured by 
supportive legislation or policies.  Thus effective empowerment depends on whether or not 
local actors or institution are being able to execute their responsibilities, rights and power 
independently.  A great number of studies have shown that for co-management initiatives to be 
successful enabling legislation must provide authoritative, legislative and financial power for 
the creation and enforcement of institutional arrangements at the local level (Pomeroy and 
Berkes 1997, Carlsson and Berkes 2005 and Ostrom 2009).  Actually governance determines 
the allocation and use of decision-making powers and Agrawal and Ribot (1999, p.476 ) 
concluded that “an in-depth understanding of the powers of various actors, the realms in which 
they exercise their powers, and to whom and how they are held accountable is necessary to 
analyze the extent to which meaningful decentralization has taken place”. 
It is frequently argued that, power sharing mechanism determines the outcomes of governance 
reform process and Agrawall and Ribot (1999), identified four broad types of decision making 
powers (discussed in section 2.7) crucial in the management of natural resources.  Thus 
determining how responsibilities are distributed among different actors, how do they 
participate in the resource management; what kind of powers and right do they exercise; and 
how benefits are shared and rules or regulations are formed etc are crucial for analyzing the the 
effectiveness or outcome of the co-management governance process.  
Empowerment can be done either devolving power or responsibilities and by enhancing 
political, social and financial capital or building capacity of the actors through training, 
acquiring new skills and sharing knowledge. Agrawal and Ribot mostly emphasize on the 
power sharing dimensions of empowerment. But, improving the actor’s capability to participate 
effectively in decision making, ability to self-organize and carry out the management task 
independently etc. are  some other important dimensions need to be considered for better 
understanding the empowerment process in the co-management of natural resources. Thus, our 
study also address the issue of capability in order to analyze whether co-management 
organizations and local actors can effectively deliver the expected outcome of governance 
reform process.  
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2.4.1.4: Capability:  Empowerment is expected to improve the capacity of resource users or 
actors both economically and politically (Pomeroy et al., 2011) through providing training, 
financial resources and sharing knowledge. Moreover, empowerment enhance the political 
capacity of local community which is important for balancing unequal power relations in co-
management governance system (Mahonge, 2010). Capability refers to the systems, plans, 
resources, skills, leadership, knowledge, and experiences that enable organizations, and the 
individuals who direct, manage, and work for them, to effectively deliver on their 
responsibilities (Lockwood, 2010). Effective implementation of co-management projects and 
success of decentralization processes depend on what types of skills and resources (financial, 
social and political) the involved actors possess. Technical skills, organizational skills, 
financial resources, communications skills and political mobilization are crucial to address 
complex social-political problems and in dealing with social inequalities and breaking the 
asymmetrical power relation. Co-management is aimed at enhancing the skills, competencies 
and capabilities of people and institutions at various levels. 
2.4.1.5: Accountability: In general, accountability concerns the allocation and acceptance of 
responsibility for decisions and actions and the extent to which a governing body is answerable 
to its constituency. It ensures that, the governing body and personnel have clearly defined roles 
and responsibilities and the governing body has demonstrated acceptance of its responsibilities 
(Lockwood, 2010). Accountability is thus the measure of responsibility and all modes of 
accountability are relational (Agrawall and Ribot, 1999). Accountability may be vertical or 
downward and downward accountability broadens the participation of local actors which is 
primary dimension of decentralization and it also enhances the responsiveness of the 
empowered actors to their constituencies (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). In the context of natural 
resource governance, however, experience suggests that success of decentralization depends 
on the devolution of adequate resources, powers and authority to elected representative bodies 
or user groups that are accountable to local community (Meynen and Doornbos, 2004). 
Downward accountability can  be  defined  as  the  institutional  mechanisms  or  processes  
through  which  executing agents or decision-makers are liable to their beneficiaries or end 
users. The transfer of power to accountable and representative local institutions is a necessary 
element of effective decentralization. (Davis et al., 2013). A number of study indicates that, 
either government or state only transfer limited power to co-management organisations and 
retain control over decision making process through excessive monitoring and the enforcement 
of laws. Or powers are often transferred to non-representative local institutions or organisation 
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that are fully accountable to central government not to local population ((Béné and Neiland, 
2006). Various researchers also highlighted that, elite capture is the most severe shortcomings 
of decentralisation process and it is the result of improper accountability mechanisms and 
devolution of power (Béné and Neiland, 2006) to customary authority or no-representative 
local actors.. Therefore the Agrawal and Ribot’s (1999), framework suggests that, in the co-
management program actors should be both downwardly accountable to constituents (local 
community) and upwardly to government or state agency. Thus, identifying the mechanisms 
of how the actors are appointed especially the electoral process, whether the authority or actors 
have clearly defined duties or not, and how their actions are monitored more specifically the 
institutional mechanism to provide justifications for their actions and decisions and how 
sanctions are enforced those who don’t comply with rules are important to analyse the 
governance reform process (Béné and Neiland, 2006).  
2.4.1.6: Transparency: Transparency means that decisions taken and their enforcement are 
done in a manner that follows rules and regulations. It also means that information is freely 
available and directly accessible to those who will be affected by such decisions and their 
enforcement (UNESCAP, 2007). According to Lockwood (2010, p.759), “Transparency refers 
to the visibility of decision-making processes; the clarity with which the reasoning behind 
decisions is communicated; and the ready availability of relevant information about a 
governance authority’s performance”. In our study we mainly focused on the flows of 
information regarding CM related activities to various stakeholders, accessibility or availability 
of information, how feedback is used in decision making process and what are the present ways 
of communication among relevant actors? 
2.5: Evolution of Co-management governance in RKWS: Co-management system was 
initiated in Bangladesh with the explicit objectives to sustainable management of forest 
resources.  This section briefly discuss the administrative, legal and policy framework for co-
management governance, history of co-management interventions and the process of  
formation of co-management organisation in RKWS. 
 
2.5.1: Administrative Framework of forest department in Bangladesh: The Ministry 
of Environment and Forests (MoEF) of the central Government is the high administrative body 
responsible for the planning, co-ordination and monitoring the implementation of forestry and 
environment related programmes or matters in the country. Bangladesh Forest Department is 
placed under the ministry of MoEF and is the primary government agency responsible for 
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enforcing different laws and regulations, managing forest resources, and implementing 
conservation activities (BFD, 2017). Forest department is administrated by a chief conservator 
of forest who is responsible for overseeing the overall operational activity of the FD. The 
organisational structure of the forest department includes different circles based on the 
geographical location and types of the forest lead by a CF (conservator of Forest). Each circle 
contains several forest divisions headed by Divisional forest officers who looks after the 
administrative matter and operational activities of the divisions (BFD, 2017). Under each 
division there are several independent sub-divisions consists of range and beat offices (the 
lowest administrative body of FD). Each range is managed by a Forest range Officer who is 
directly accountable to Divisional Forest Officer. Range officer is in executive charge of his 
range who is responsible for carrying out day to day management activities, patrolling in the 
forest, investigation of forest offences, resolving resource related disputes etc. with the help of 
beat officers and forest guard.  
 
2.5.2: History of co-management interventions in RKWS: Following global trend of 
decentralisation in the forestry sector in developing countries, Bangladesh Forest Department 
also launched a co-management program named Nishorgo Support Project (NSP) in one of the 
country’s protected areas in 2004 with the financial assistance of USAID (Sharma et al. 2008). 
Initially the project was implemented in five pilot sites and RKWS was one of them. During 
that period major stakeholder groups were identified and co-management organizations 
(CMOs) and institutions were formed. After the successful implementation of NSP, 
government was initiated another project (Five years phase: 2008-2013) with the direct support 
from USAID in 2008, named “Integrated Protected Area Management Program (IPAC)” for 
strengthening the legislative and financial foundations of the Co-management process (IPAC, 
2013). Then, in 2013, Climate Resilient Ecosystems and Livelihoods (CREL) project was 
launched (funded by USAID) with the aim to ensure improved governance of protected areas 
and increase resilience to climate change through adapting successful co management models 
and livelihood diversification. In, RKWS, a national NGO named Center for Natural Resource 
Studies (CNRS) is implementing this project and helping co-management organizations 
(CMOs) in arranging regular meetings, creating activity plans or management plans, arranging 
training for building capacity of key stakeholders (individuals, communities and government).  
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2.5.3: Legal and Policy framework for governing protected area through co-
management: The forests of Bangladesh is managed and administered by the several laws, 
policies and regulations of which, Forest Act 1927 (Amendment in 2000), Forest Policy 1994, 
Wildlife (Conservation and Security) Act 2012 and Bangladesh Biological Diversity Act 2012 
are mainly act as the foundation for overall forest management in Bangladesh.   
 
Table 2: Key Stakeholder Groups in RKWS (Source: Official document of RKWS CMC) 
 
Under the Wildlife (Conservation and Security) Act 2012, government can declare any area as 
protected area and initiate co-management system for proper utilization, conservation and 
management of natural resources. According to section 16 (1) and 16 (2) of Wildlife 
Preservation and Security Act, 2012 , “The Government may, for each sanctuary, prepare a 
management plan in accordance with the manner prescribed by rules and The Chief Warden of 
forest department, shall bear all responsibilities of implementation and management of 
management plan.” Currently this act is working as a guideline and legal policy document for 
PA management in Bangladesh. Co-management system was introduced in the protected area 
under forestry co-management official gazette notification in 2006. This gazette notification 
was issued by the Ministry of Environment and Forests through bureaucratic orders, not based 
in parliamentary process and legal. As a result, it doesn’t have any strong legal ground and can 
be changed or cancelled simply through government administrative orders. However, this 
government gazette provided the provisions and instructions on formation of co-management 
institutions such as co-management council and co-management committee (CMC) by 
including representatives from various stakeholder groups. This gazette notification was acted 
as a foundation for initiating the co-management activities in protected areas (PA) which was 
later revised and amended in 2010. The main actor groups and co-management organizations 
(CMOs) in RKWS are described in Table 2.  
Name of local 
Organizations 
No Members Total 
Members Male Female 
Co-management Council 1 53 11 64 
Co-management Committee 
(CMC) 
1 26 03 29 
Peoples Forum (PF) 1 59 33 92 
Youth Club (YC) 4 - - - 
Community Patrolling 
Group 
8 141 0 141 
Village Conservation Forum 
(VCF) 
46 1941 1269 3210 
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2.5.4: Formation of the Co-management Organisations in RKWS:  According to the 
gazette, co-management council forms the first tier of the institution which should consist of 
65 members through selecting representatives from the different stakeholder groups such as 
Local Government, Local Elite, Civil Society, and Resource owning Groups, Forest User 
Groups or Peoples Forum, Youth Club, Community Patrolling Groups, Forest Department, 
Local NGOs and other Government departments. This council will be elected for four years 
and responsible for the monitoring and approving the activities of PA landscape. Then, the 
council will create a co-management committee (CMC) consisting of 29 members by selecting 
or electing people from the same stakeholder groups. The two key actors of co-management 
committee (CMC) are Forest Department (28% member) and Peoples Forum (21 % member) 
(Figure: 2).   
 
Figure 2: Key stakeholders and Organizational Structure of co-management committee (CMC) 
This co-management committee (CMC) acts as an executive body responsible for taking 
regular activities in the PA such as preparing the management plan, creating project proposals, 
implementing plan, distributing benefits and responsibilities, resolving conflicts, serving as 
liaison between FD officials and local people, maintaining income and expenditure, 
undertaking necessary measures for the protection of forest according to the instruction of 
28%
7%
21%
7%
3%
7%
10%
7%
7%
3%
Organisational Structure of Co-management Committee (CMC)
Forest Department Civil Society/Local Elite
Peoples Forum (PF) Forest Conservation Club
Resource Owning Group Ethnic Minority
Community Patrolling Group (CPG) Local government Representative
Law Enforcement Gov. Institution Rep.
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Divisional Forest Officer (DFO) etc.  This committee is elected for two years and accountable 
to co-management council and People Forum (PF) (Government Gazette Notification, 2010). 
 
2.6: Research Design:  
 
 
In our study, firstly we identified the key actors and analyzed whether co-management (CM) 
regime has created opportunity for the various actors to actively participate in the decision 
making process. Then, we focused on the empowerment of actors, especially what types of 
power they are entitled to exercise in practice and how their authority is legitimized.  Agrawal 
and Ribot (1999) recognized four broad powers of decision-making crucial in natural resource 
governance and categorized powers into three types (A) Legislative (Power to create and 
modify rules and regulations); (B) Executive (Power to make decisions on management and 
utilization; implement management activities and ensuring compliance of the formulated rules 
and regulations) and (C) Judicial: (Power to resolve conflict or disputes).  Power in this context 
is defined as the ability of actors or organisations to create rules, make decisions, enforce law 
and resolve disputes and Agrawal and Ribots’ (1999) power typology was chosen to analyze 
actor’s power in this study. This power analysis framework suits the existing nature of the 
power relationship between government and the community because in Bangladesh 
governments formally hold all three types of power and co-management system was initiated 
to share legal, managerial and authoritative power with local actors and co-management 
organisations.  Then, we used the principle of transparency to understand the visibility of 
decision making process and how these decisions are communicated with concerned actors or 
stakeholders. Then, we used the principle of Accountability to identify the flow of 
accountability (Downward or Upward or both) and to whom the Actors are accountable to for 
their actions and decisions. Finally, we analyzed the capability of actors whether they have the 
technical skills, knowledge and financial resources to maintain the day to day management 
activities and deliver the promised outcomes of CM governance process.  
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Chapter Three:  Materials and Methods 
This chapter comprises of six sections which includes brief description of the study area, details 
explanation about research methods employed for the study, process of data analysis, ethical 
aspects of the research and finally this chapter concludes with describing the challenges and 
limitations of the study.  
 
3.1. Brief description of Study Area:  The Rema-Kalenga Wildlife Sanctuary (RKWS) falls 
under the administrative jurisdiction of Sylhet Forest Division. Geographically the wildlife 
sanctuary is located in between 24°05ˈ-24˚13ˈ N latitude and 9134-91-40 E longitude. It is the 
second largest forest and wildlife sanctuary in Bangladesh which comprises an area of 1995 
hectare (Chowdhury et al., 2011). This forest is remnant for its diverse flora, fauna and high 
conservation value. It is one of the reaming patches of tropical natural hill forest in Bangladesh 
which is under extreme threat due climate change driven natural calamities and anthropogenic 
pressure. This forest was declared as a Wildlife Sanctuary in 1996 under the IUCN category of 
Figure 3: Map of the study area (Sources: Chowdhury et al., (2011). 
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Protected Area (IV) It is also home to various indigenous communities including Tripura, 
Marma, Cakma, Orang and people living in the almost 50 villages inside and adjacent to the 
sanctuary and who depend heavily on forest resources for their livelihoods (Morshed, 2013). 
This protected area (PA) is unique from the perspectives of biodiversity richness as well as for 
the high level of exploitation and human interference. 
 
3.2: Data collection Procedures: Our research design was based on the philosophical 
underpinnings of qualitative methodology as our aim was to explore the perceived 
understanding of relevant actors about the ongoing process of power devolution through co-
management system at study site. Thus qualitative methods were used to collect empirical data 
and details procedure of field data collection are described below.  
3.2.1: Focus Group Discussion and Observation: With the aim of understanding the current 
process of co-management governance, qualitative techniques such as Focus Group Discussion 
(FGD) through open ended questionnaire was used as a methodological tool for collecting data. 
Peoples Forum (PF), Community Patrolling Group (CPG) and Youth Club (YC) are the key 
community stakeholder’s group in RKWS.  So, two interactive FGDs (each consisting of 8-10 
members) were carried out at study site of which one at the beginning of fieldwork with 
Community Patrolling Group (CPG) and Youth Club (YC) members.  
Table 3: Summary of FGD Participants 
No Participants Category  Participants Total 
Participants 
Place of 
Discussion 
Date 
FGD 1 Community Patrolling 
Group (CPG) 
5 9 Youth Club 
Office, 
Kalenga 
17-05-2016 
Youth Club (YC) 
members 
4 
FGD 2 Peoples Forum (PF) 
General members 
8 8 Alinagor 15-06-2016 
 
The interview questions for key respondents was also shared during the first FGD and revised 
to reflect the feedback or suggestion from FGD participants and then correction was done 
accordingly.  The second FGD was conducted at the end of field visit and only members from 
Peoples Forum (PF) were invited to participate in that FGD (Table 3). The questionnaire for 
FGD was focused on the knowledge of various stakeholders group regarding the structure and 
process of co-management in RKWS. Besides this, I also participated in various co-
managements organizations’ (CMOs) regular meetings (such as three village conservation 
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forums’ (VCFs) monthly meeting, one peoples forums’ (PF) executive committee meeting, one 
youth club and one Community Patrolling Groups’(CPG) monthly meeting) in order to 
understand the current mechanism of interaction among various stakeholders and how the 
decisions are taken in real ground. I have spent six weeks (two visits) in the field for collecting 
data and observations of management practices were also made during my stay at study site. 
3.2.2: Semi-structured Interview: Semi-structured interviews were conducted with key actors 
to explore in depth of their perception and experience regarding the current process of power 
devolution through CM governance. Interview questions are more details and different from 
FGD questions as it sought to gather information from key actors regarding their experience 
and involvement in co-management activities. Potential respondents for in-depth interviewees 
were selected through prior consultation with Forest Department (FD), Co-management 
committee and project (NGO) staffs by considering their engagement and relevance to the co-
management program as well as based on documentary evidence. The process of FGD also 
helped in determining the key respondents. In total, eleven co-management committee (CMC) 
members were selected across the study sites from various stakeholders groups and full details 
of key respondents are summarized in Appendix A. Forest officials provided useful insights 
about legal aspects of PA management and their views on existing co-management program. 
Other informants from community groups also provided important information about the 
ongoing devolution process. Out of eleven, 9 interviews were conducted in person (face to 
face) mostly at the local setting and two interviews were conducted over phone due to the 
absent of informants during my field visit.  
3.2.3 : Secondary Data Collection:  Secondary information such as project evaluation reports, 
NGOs reports,  co-management plan, Forest Department’s reports and annual plan, Newspaper  
reports, meeting resolutions, policy documents were collected from CREL project site office 
and Forest Department range office as well as from using relevant websites and internet.  The 
collected documents were reviewed and used as a starting point to understand the objectives, 
activities, and reported progress of the ongoing co-management project at my study site.  
 
 
 
 
3.3: Data Processing and Analysis:  Qualitative data analysis software “MAXQDA 12” was 
used to process, analyse and interpret the complex phenomena of qualitative data with the aim 
to find the result of the study. As Silverman, (2014) stated that qualitative research mostly 
focus on exploring the “phenomena” in depth. So in order to avoid early assumption or 
hypothesis all the interviews raw data were transcribed and translated through detailed reading. 
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Firstly, code was assigned on text segments of transcripts in order to organize the huge volume 
of qualitative data in a systematic manner. Identifying the key, essential, striking, odd and 
interesting things in the text is necessary for qualitative data analysis (Silverman, 2014). So, 
all the data were sorted, labelled and structured to find similar phrases, commonalities and 
differences. Thereafter, the codes with the same labels were organized to form a group, i.e. a 
theme and themes were categorized in relation to their significance and relevance to research 
questions. Some codes also emerged while the interview transcripts were reviewed inductively. 
Then, the collected empirical data was analyzed in light of the theory and principles with the 
purpose of answering the research questions. Multiple methods of data collection is used as a 
common strategy of triangulation in qualitative research (Silverman, 2014). So, qualitative 
information collected through FGDs and secondary materials were used and cross checked with 
interview data in order to avoid the misleading information, wrong interpretation, minimize the 
effect of bias and ensure validity and reliability.  
 
 
3.4: Ethical Consideration:  Formal approval was obtained from co-management committee 
(CMC) and Forest department (FD) before initiating field work where detailed working method 
was described. Informed consent and maintaining confidentiality are central to the most ethical 
guidelines of qualitative research (Silverman, 2014).  Thus, before moving ahead with the 
interview, the goals and limitations of the research and procedures of data collection was 
explained thoroughly. The questions were purposefully asked to explore their individual 
experience and perception regarding the co-management governance and no attempt was 
undertaken to obtain access to traditional knowledge.  All conversations were recorded in 
writing during interview sessions and audio recording was used but respondent’s permission 
was sought before recording the interview. All the interviews were conducted mostly in the 
local settlements (e.g. in respondents’ houses, local markets or public places). During and after 
the fieldwork, participants’ rights and privacy was protected. Collected data was organized 
through coding and all data was treated anonymously and confidentially. Special arrangement 
was done for conducting female interview by discussing the matter with the family head and 
community leaders well ahead of time when necessary. Findings of the research will be shared 
with the CMC, FD and community upon completion of the study through arranging a workshop 
or meeting if time and budget permits. 
 
 
3.5: Challenges and Limitations:   Conducting FGD and in-depth interview of diverse actors 
in a rural setting was really a challenging task. Because, the perceptions and views regarding 
co-management approach was varied across different stakeholders. Another major limitation 
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was to make sure all participants are freely participating in the interview process and expressing 
their views and perception. Time and resource constraint were some other potential challenges 
encountered during the study. Since I had only six weeks for gathering data in the field and it 
was really hard to finish the whole data collection procedure within that time period. Because, 
at that time local government election was going on and people were extremely busy with the 
election. I was really struggling to get adequate opportunity to meet all the selected key actors 
in person because of their business during daytime. As a result, I had to change the list of 
interview participants and had to conduct two interviews over phone. Access to government 
data and project reports and interviewing the forestry officials also represented major practical 
challenges. I admit that the governance dimensions and power dynamics of CM approach is 
really vast and complex. Thus, it’s nearly impossible to address all the social, institutional, 
political and economic aspects of NRM governance in a single research which might leave 
some inaccuracies. 
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Chapter Four:  Empirical Materials  
 
This chapter presents the key findings based on qualitative data collected in the field as well as 
secondary materials in relation to the present governance reform in the RKWS. This section is 
organised under five major themes and these themes were selected based on the research 
questions and objectives of the study. The main heading of thematic areas are as follows: 
Perception of various actors about the ongoing paradigm shift through CM process, 
Institutional arrangements of CM system for joint management, Mechanism of power and 
benefit sharing, Degree of collaboration between FD and CMOs’ and Capability of actors to 
provide long term sustainability of CM process. 
4.1: General Perception about co-management process, Key Actors and Participation  
Co-management (CM) engages multiple stakeholders from different social categories linked 
with the power sharing and decision making process. Therefore, understanding how local 
communities or different actors perceive the context and multiple dimensions of CM is 
necessary for analyzing the present governance reform in the case study area.  As a result, 
respondents were asked some basic questions regarding their understanding about CM, roles 
and responsibilities of various CMO members/stakeholders, present mechanism of 
communication among various actors, how CM is improving the forest conditions and human 
well-being and the scope of participation of local people in decision making process. 
Since various actors are from heterogeneous social groups, I expected to get a diverse opinion 
regarding the definition of co-management (CM). But surprisingly almost all of the actors (both 
FD and Local community) had a homogeneous perception regarding the definition of CM and 
according to them “Co-management is simply a way of creating various committees by 
including representatives or members from local community, Forest Department, Civil society, 
etc for protecting the forest and helping forest department”. The only exception was the 
president of CMC who stated “Co-management means, the management of a forest or protected 
area through engaging various community groups in decision making and power sharing 
process which will ensure forest protection and provide socio-economic benefit”. On the other 
hand FD personnel defined co-management as “Any organization (for example NGOs, CREL 
or CMC/CPG) that provides services or help Forest department to protect the forest from 
further degradation is called co-management”  
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According to official gazette notification 2010, co-management committee (CMC) is the main 
executive and administrative body of a protected area (PA) which is formed by selecting 
representatives from each of the lower tier namely PF, CPG, VCF, YC (Table 4). 
Table 4: Major roles of key Stakeholder Groups/ CMO’s in co-management arrangements  
Key 
Stakeholder 
Groups  
Roles and Responsibilities Legal 
framework 
Co-management 
Council 
 Supervision and Guidance 
 Monitoring the activities of CMC (in Theory) 
Official Gazette 
2010 
Co-management 
Committee 
(CMC) 
 Help Forest Department in forest protection 
 Organize monthly CMC meeting 
 Prepare ADB with the help of NGO/CREL 
 Monitor the activities of CPG, PF, Youth Club, VCF 
 Beneficiary Selection for Social Forestry 
 Conflict Resolution 
 Implementation of activities taken with the help of 
CREL Project/Grant 
 Providing some income generation activities through 
CMC fund for reducing dependency on forests 
 Building awareness 
 
Gazette 
Notification of 
the government 
2010  
Peoples Forum 
(PF) 
 Organizing monthly Executive Committee (EC) 
meeting,  
 Creating awareness among people about the 
importance of forest  
 Discuss the issues, demands or suggestion of VCF 
meetings in CMC meeting. 
 Help FD in Forest Conservation 
No formal legal 
framework 
Community 
Patrolling 
Group (CPG) 
 Key duty is to protect forest and helping the Forest 
department. 
 Patrolling in the Forest, Capture illicit feller, Seize 
Logs  
 Organize monthly meeting  
 Motivating people, building awareness among 
community members about the importance of forest 
No legal Base 
Youth Club  Help FD in Fire Control and forest protection 
 Aware People about the importance of wildlife 
conservation 
 Capture illegal hunter or poacher; 
 Monitor and patrol in the forest areas. 
 
No legal Base 
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Village 
Conservation 
Forum (VCF) 
 Awareness Building among villagers 
 Attend in Monthly VCF meeting 
 Engage VCF members in Livelihood related activities  
 Help in forest conservation and protection 
 
No legal base 
Data Sources: (Gazette Notification 2010, Resolution of the Monthly Meeting of CMC, Project 
Report, Key informant Interviews and FGDs). (In Table 4, bold italic sentence denotes the 
common responsibility shared by various actors group).  
 
Representatives from various stakeholder groups reported that, building awareness among 
people, motivate the resource users about the importance of forest, protecting forest and 
wildlife, helping forest department and attending monthly meeting are the key roles and 
responsibilities of CMO members. In theory, various stakeholder groups are supposed to have 
specific roles to play in co-management (CM) arrangements but in practice these were found 
to overlap to a great extent among various actors (Table 4).  
Co-management committee (CMC) is the main decision making body regarding the activities 
taken at PA and they are in the legal position of monitoring the activities of other lower tier 
CMO’s (PF, CPG, VCF, YC). CPG is mainly working in forest patrolling and Youth Club 
(YC) is helping FD in controlling forest fire and illegal hunting. Peoples Forum (PF) and 
Village Conservation Forum (VCF) members don’t seem to have regular specified tasks to do 
and mainly work for building awareness among local villagers. 
 In the study site, the majority of respondent stakeholders (82%) stated that they don’t have any 
proper idea about their actual tasks, and roles and responsibilities of CMO members are not 
clearly defined in the co-management gazette (Figure 4).  Moreover, both FD and CMC 
members highlighted that the present CMC president is playing a vital role in CM process and 
his leadership skills and political power has helped to achieve some positive outcomes. 
In the government gazette, there is a lack of information and specificity about the roles and 
responsibilities of general CMC members, office bearers post and other stakeholder groups. 
One of the CMC member and representatives of Youth Club was sharing his frustration “I am 
the president of a youth club but it doesn’t have any legal basis, we don’t even have any formal 
structure about our working scope, roles, rights etc. So responsibility of Youth club, CPG, PF, 
CMC should be defined very clearly otherwise it creates vagueness and problems. It seems like 
everybody is doing the same thing because nobody knows what his main responsibility is?” 
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In the government gazette, there is a lack of information and specificity about the roles and 
responsibilities of general CMC members, office bearers post and other stakeholder groups. 
One of the CMC member and representatives of Youth Club was sharing his frustration “I am 
the president of a youth club but it doesn’t have any legal basis, we don’t even have any formal 
structure about our working scope, roles, rights etc. So responsibility of Youth club, CPG, PF, 
CMC should be defined very clearly otherwise it creates vagueness and problems. It seems like 
everybody is doing the same thing because nobody knows what his main responsibility is?”   
Figure 4: Perceived understanding and experience about co-management (CM) process by 
key respondents 
However, majority of the key respondents reported that they are happy with the present 
mechanism of taking decision because all the activities taken by CMC with the assistance of 
CREL project are always discussed in the monthly CMC meeting and members can share their 
concern and suggestions (Figure 4). But, they also had negative feelings about the involvement 
of local actors in planning and design process of CM. Both the main parties (Forest Department 
and Communities) have agreed (100%) that co-management has made a remarkable progress 
in the protection of forest and conservation of wildlife in RKWS (Figure 4). Majority of the 
respondent (80%) pointed that joint patrolling and social network among various actors have 
created a barrier for doing illegal activities both by FD staffs and illicit feller which has resulted 
in limiting corruption (Figure, 4) .  
Findings from FGD’s and key respondents interview also revealed that there is a huge positive 
change in the attitude and perception of Forest Department staffs towards the local community 
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and now there is a good social relation between these two parties (Figure, 4). One of the CMC 
members and representative from Ethnic Community was sharing his perception as follows:  
“In the past, local people didn’t get the chance to meet forest Officers, they couldn’t even have 
the rights to enter into the premise of forest office; if they wanted to meet any forest officer they 
had to seek appointment with the help of headman of the villagers but now we can visit them 
whenever we need and share our concern/problems; at least they don’t treat us like an animal 
at all and I perceive it as a positive change”.  
 Respondents from forest department also appreciated this change and stated that “Historically 
there was a rivalry relationship between FD and local community. They didn’t trust us, we 
didn’t tolerate them. So there was a huge conflict. But, co-management has made a good 
progress in establishing social relationship and building trust between these two parties”.  
Almost all of the key informants and FGD participants stated that their social status has been 
raised and they feel more respected than before. They also shared their fear that the attitude of 
forestry officials is not static and mostly depends on their personal intention and interests. If 
forest department (FD) staff is honest he would support CMC but if he is dishonest and corrupt 
he wouldn’t help them and create lots of barrier so that CMC wouldn’t carry out their 
operational activities properly. Several respondents reported that, they had a struggling period 
before and some FD officials didn’t even allow them to enter into the PA for carrying out the 
activities of CMC.  One of the FD staffs was also supporting their claim and fear of local 
community and he also replied: “Now, the relation between co-management committee (CMC) 
and forest department (FD) is really much better if you compare it with past. But, if FD staff is 
corrupted he won’t help CMC or community members and he will treat community members 
differently. So, attitude towards CMC or community sometimes depends on the personal 
interest of FD staffs but overall the relationship is good”. This fragile and unstable condition 
of communication indicates the weakness of institutional arrangements of CM process.  
4.2: Power Sharing Mechanism in Co-management Process 
One of the key objectives of CM system is to transfer rights, responsibility and decision making 
power from government to local community. Thus, examining the existing mechanism of 
power sharing is necessary to understand the ongoing devolution process. Each and every CM 
arrangement is designed to share some degree of power and expected to improve the unequal 
power relations. So, in this section we will mainly focus on the types of power co-management 
organizations (CMOs) have in theory and how they are exercising these power in practice.  
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4.2.1: Legislative Power: Formulation of Rules, Regulations or Bylaws 
Focus group discussions and key informants interview revealed that CMC has no legal power 
to make new rules, guidelines or bylaws; even they can’t change or modify the existing rules 
or CM guidelines. Almost all the CMC members (Except Forestry Officials) perceived an 
inability to influence the rule creation and decision making process.  In Bangladesh, reserve 
forests and protected areas (PA) are declared under the Forest Act 1927 and Wildlife Sanctuary 
is declared under the Bangladesh Wildlife preservation Order 1973 (Rahman, 2005).   
As we discussed in chapter 2 (section 2.5), that government gazette notification, 2010 is the 
only approved piece of formal documents for initiating co-management program in PA of 
Bangladesh. This gazette notification is just an administrative order not a legal policy 
document. It mostly emphasizes on the guidelines for creating co-management council and Co-
management committee by selecting representatives from designated stakeholders groups in 
the PA. Our result finds that, according to the Gazette notification 2010, CMC has no legal 
power to make any new rules and change or modify the government guidelines. It’s really 
surprising that in the gazette they didn’t even define what co-management is?  Though this 
gazette has specified the responsibilities of CM committees and council but these guidelines 
are very abstract, descriptive, and subjective to interpretation and there is no clear instruction 
on how CMC will manage or organize its activities.  
Even, people’s forum (PF) doesn’t have any legal base, they just mentioned it in the gazette 
but they didn’t specify its working scope, organizational structure, roles and responsibilities 
etc. Majority of the respondents feel that this gazette is not compatible with their interests and 
needs. For example, according to gazette a person can’t be elected as a CMC member or 
president for more than two times (each term two years) consecutively but all the respondents 
(both from community and Forest Department) have said that the present CMC president is a 
very good and honest person who possess dynamic leadership skills and they want him as a 
president again. But he was the CMC president for the last two terms and now according to 
guidelines he won’t be elected as a president anymore.   
“There is nothing in this gazette about the authorities and administrative role of CMC; it just 
provided some instructions on how to form a CM committee. If FD has given the authority or 
power to us for creating our own rules and management plan by taking into consideration the 
social-ecological and political context, then there should be a real sense of collaboration in 
practice.” (CMC vice-president was sharing his perception about government gazette) 
38 
 
The majority of the respondents reported that there is no clear mechanism for sharing of 
benefits arising from co-management project. Co-management committee (CMC) and 
Community Patrolling Groups (CPGs) were demanding some incentives from the revenue 
collected through public auction of illicit timber seized by them during patrolling in the 
protected area (PA).  But FD has denied to provide them any share or percentage since there is 
no provision for that and co-management committee (CMC) doesn’t have any legal rights to 
create new rules or guidelines for benefit sharing.   
Another major critical issue was identified during the discussion with key respondents and 
FGD participants regarding the criteria of selecting members for the co-management 
committee (CMC). The majority of respondents complained that the members selected from 
the category of civil society especially (Journalist and Freedom fighter), government officials 
and resource owner groups are not interested in co-management. They are very infrequent in 
the monthly meeting and CMC hardly received any support from them. Reviewing the meeting 
resolution and attendance list of monthly CMC meeting for last one year it was also revealed 
the same.  The average rate of participants in every CMC meeting is 19-21 (out of 29) and 
members from Civil society, Government officials and Resource Owning Group remained 
absent for the monthly CMC meetings. So, the membership selection criteria need to be revised 
but CMC couldn’t make any decision about this issue because in the gazette there is nothing 
about whether CMC can adjust or modify the criteria for member selection.  
In addition, in the gazette there is nothing about the legal framework of CPG, PF, YC etc. and 
exclusion and inclusion criteria of members for these CMOs.  According to the Wildlife 
(Conservation and security) Act, 2012 “The Government may, by notification in the official 
Gazette, make rules, constitution, powers, functions and tenure of co-management committee’. 
So, in practice CMC or local community has no legislative power and this one way of making 
regulation made them feel powerless and being out of the rules of the game. The way CMC has 
taken roots in RKWS revealed that FD is still holding all the legislative power and one of the 
forest department (FD) officials stated “All legal power should be in the hands of FD and CMC 
only can perform some activities outside of core zone in prior consultation and permission with 
FD”. Thus, in practice local stakeholders have very limited scope to influence the design and 
implementation of devolution policies. 
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4.2.2: Executive Power: Decision Making, Enforcement and Compliance 
According to the CM Gazette (2010), CMC is allowed to develop short term and long term 
management plans or annual development plans (ADB) for the PA but they can only operate 
their activities in the buffer zone2 and landscape area3. Moreover, this plan needs to be 
approved by Divisional Forest Officer (DFO) and there is no financial and technical support 
available for CMC from forest department (FD) or government. In RKWS, CMC is doing some 
development activities and arranging livelihood related training with the direct help of donor 
supported projects. The majority of the key respondents and FGD participants of community 
patrolling groups (CPG) and youth club (YC) stated that, a couple of months ago CMC made 
a plan about giving some fallow Lunga (low valley between two hills) to CPG groups so that 
they can manage these Lunga for fish farming and create an alternative income source for the 
members who are involved in forest patrolling and conservation activities. But Forest 
Department rejected their demand and said that CMC is not allowed to do any activities inside 
the PA. So, in theory CMC can prepare a project plan but in practice they don’t have any 
executive power to implement the decision until it is approved by the District Forest Officer. 
Thus, CMC is only allowed to carry out activities which are mainly compatible with the needs 
and laws of the Forest Department.  In practice, still FD is playing the main authoritative role 
in decision making regarding PA management because they have the legal policy and 
administrative support from the government.  
Since, CPGs are doing regular patrolling in the PA, so they can arrest or capture the illicit feller 
and seize the logs.  But CMC or CPG don’t have any power to arrest a corrupted forest official 
or take legal action against them. All the key respondents from local community have stated 
that CMC can take legal action against CPG or CMC members and general public but CMC 
has no power to sanction against any FD staffs. In the gazette, there is nothing about how to 
ensure compliance with rules, how to enforce decisions and rules and how to sanction offenders 
with penalties especially how the violators are going to be sanctioned.  
                                                          
2 “Buffer zone” means any forest lying in the margin of protected area or  degraded forest area  adjoining 
human habitation,  except core zone,  where local community people are inclined to harvest  forest  
product. (Bangladesh Wildlife Preservation and Conservation Act, 2012. p.3) 
 
3 “Landscape  zone"  means  a  public  or  private  area  outside  the  boundaries  of  designated  
sanctuary, national park and ecopark that regulates the biodiversity of the protected area and  which  is  
managed  to  maintain  similar  landscape  of  the  protected  area  for  deterring  degradation of the 
protected area and  where  safe movement of wild animals is  ensured    and  which is declared as 
landscape zone under section 20 (Bangladesh Wildlife Preservation and Conservation Act, 2012. p.3) 
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This vagueness in CM gazette has created frustration among CMC members. CMC president  
was sharing his frustration regarding this issue “We need to specify the roles and 
responsibilities of various stakeholders in CMC especially if someone disobeys the rules and 
don’t perform his duty properly what will be the punishment, who will take the authoritative 
and management decision; who will implement the decision; what will be the role of FD and 
CMC, whom they are accountable to; if the CMC or FD don’t follow or comply with the rules 
or disagree to cooperate who will solve the problems and how; all these issues need to be 
clarified and solved”.  
4.2.3: Resolution of Conflicts- the judicial approach  
CMC has no legal judicial power and there is no clear guidelines in the gazette on what types 
of mechanism CMC can deploy for resolving conflicts over benefit sharing and forest access 
or tenure rights. But in practice, all the key respondents have stated that CMC has been playing 
a key role in conflict resolution and they have an informal way of minimizing the conflict. 
Actually, in the study area three types of conflicts are found: Conflicts between CPG/CMC 
with FD, conflicts regarding sharing of benefit from social forestry plantation among various 
actors and conflict among CMOs or member within a co-management organizations. 
The conflicts between FD and CPG regarding the routine patrol are mostly dependent on the 
intention of FD staffs and activities of CPG members. If the FD staff is dishonest he normally 
doesn’t allow CPG to perform their roster duty inside the PA. On the other hand if CPG 
members are involved in illegal activities, FD staff don’t allow them for patrolling. In, both 
cases this allegation or issues are normally shared in the monthly CMC meeting and then CMC 
creates a small committee consisting of representatives from FD and CMC members for 
investigating the case. The committee arranges meetings with both parties and if they find that 
any CMC, Forest Guard or CPG members are guilty they submit the inquiry report to CMC. 
Then CMC take the final decision with the presence of FD staffs and other parties. CMC has 
been resolving this kind of issues successfully and they have already taken action against 
various CPG members and excluded them from the groups. One of the respondents shared “We 
have taken action against several CPG members who were involved in illicit felling. We have 
discussed this issue in CMC meeting and canceled their membership and if the crime is really 
very extreme then we ask the FD to take legal action against them according to law. CMC also 
solve the conflicts among various member within a group in the same way.” 
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Another major arena of disagreement is the selection of beneficiary for the social forestry 
projects. Though majority of the key respondents were saying that there was no elite pressure 
and the way beneficiary is selected is quite fine. But the FGD participants had a totally opposite 
opinion about this issue and they claimed that in most of the cases politically influential person, 
local elite and outsiders are included in the social forestry scheme with the help of corrupted 
FD staffs and influential CMC members. This issue has created frustration among poor 
villagers who are involved in conservation and forest protection activities because this is the 
only way they can at least get some incentives for their work. One of the FGD respondents 
from Youth Club “It has created lots of problems and distrust among various groups. So in 
the last month CMC and FD have agreed that from now on all the beneficiary of social forestry 
project will be selected through CMC meeting. We wholeheartedly appreciate the decision and 
hope now at least real poor people will get some opportunity (FGD_CPG_YC_001)”. 
In order to resolve this issue, CMC and FD have made a decision that all the beneficiaries will 
be selected jointly by FD and local community with prior consultation in CMC meeting. 
Respondents also identified some other types of conflict especially conflicts between land 
encroacher and FD, conflict between Forest Villagers and FD, conflict between FD with other 
government organizations etc. But FD never involves CMC in those issues and they resolve it 
thorough using their legal judicial power and constitutional authority assigned on FD.  
 
4.2.4: Is Co-management restructuring Power Relations?  
Though co-management was introduced to facilitate the governance process through altering 
unequal power relations but our result suggest that there has been very limited transfer of 
legislative and executive power from state to local co-management organizations (CMOs) and 
still FD controls all management decisions and determines the degree of participation. As a 
consequence, CMC is functioning without legal backing and state support and in practice 
CMOs have no power to take management or administrative decision, change rules and 
implement plan independently.  
Table 5, summarizes the findings from this section and demonstrates the existing power 
relation in RKWS, most specifically what types of power have been transferred or devolved 
from central authority to local community through this CM process.   
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Table 5: List of Key Actors/CMO’s and their powers in Co-management arrangements at RKWS 
 
 
Types of Power 
Major Actors 
Forest 
Departm
ent (FD) 
CM 
Council 
Co-Management 
Committee 
(CMC) 
Village 
Conservation 
Forum (VCF) 
Community 
Patrolling 
Group 
Youth 
Club 
Peoples 
Forum 
Create and modify rules, bylaws 
and regulations 
Yes No No No No No No 
Enforcing rules, Apply sanction 
for violation of operational rules 
Yes Partially 
Yes*a 
Partially Yes*a No Limited Scale Limited 
Scale 
No 
Make decision on management  
of PA 
Yes Partially 
Yes*b 
Partially Yes*b No No No No 
Make administrative decision Yes No No No No No No 
Make decision on benefit 
sharing and resource utilization 
Yes No Partially Yes*c No No No No 
Implement management 
activities 
Yes No Partially Yes*d No No No Partially 
Yes*d 
Resolving conflict Yes Partially 
Yes*e 
Partially Yes*e No No No Partially 
Yes*e 
Source : (Gazette Notification 2010, Resolution of the Monthly Meeting of CMC, Project Report, Key informant Interviews and FGDs) 
*a= only capture illicit logger, poacher and seize logs and take legal action against CMC, CPG or community members not against FD staffs. 
*b= need prior approval from the Forest Department; *c=only take decision regarding social forestry beneficiary selection; *d=only implement 
project taken by CMC through CREL/NGO grants; *e= Only solve disputes within various actor groups, among the members of CPG or CMC 
but don’t have the power to solve land use related conflict, conflict between FD and Land encroacher etc.
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The main decision and policy making power about PA is still formally vested with the Forest 
department and still Forest officials largely retaining their view of following control and 
command approach and not giving any authoritative or managerial power to CMC. In practice, 
the power relation context of the RKWS hasn’t changed much to embrace meaningful joint 
management. As we can see from the Table 4, none of the stakeholder groups (CMC, PF, CPG, 
VCF or YC) has power to make modification to state rules though some of the rules have 
already proven to be impossible to implement and some are not suited to the socio-political and 
geographical context of the study site.  
Though CM Council, CM committee, CPG or Youth Club members can capture illicit feller, 
poacher, seize logs but these stakeholders group are not entitled with legitimate authority to 
sanction those power against FD, Local Police and local government officers if they are found 
guilty and refused to comply with their rules. Only FD has the legal authoritative and 
administrative power to make decision about the management of PA (Table 5). Among the 
CMOs, only CMC has the partial power to make decision about sharing benefit from PA but it 
entirely focus on only social forestry scheme. CMC and PF have some power to implement the 
activities taken by CMC through CREL grants but they can only operate their activities in the 
landscape area especially the adjacent villages not inside the PA (Table 5).  
CM Council, CMC and PF have the power to resolve conflict which is mainly oriented to 
community members but CBO’s are not legally able to apply penalties against FD staffs or 
other Government officials who are included in the CM process.  So, all these powers 
(Legislative, Executive and Judicial) are retained in the governments’ realm and there has been 
no meaningful transfer of decision making power and responsibility towards local level Co-
management organizations (CMOs). In addition, CMOs’ power to implement and ensure 
compliance with rules, make management related decision has been limited due to poor 
institutional arrangements and legal policy support. So, still there is an unequal power relation 
and one of the respondent stated “If CMC doesn’t have any management, authoritative and 
legal power then how would you say it is collaborative management”.
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4.3: Accountability and Transparency:  
In practice, there is a dual governance system in the RKWS: one is by run by FD inside the PA 
and another one is by CMC outside of PA, mainly in the landscape area. FD is following their 
traditional top down approach and they have their own departmental routine activities for 
managing PA which is totally outside of the jurisdiction of CMC. To date, FD retains the main 
authoritative, managerial and decision making power regarding PA and CMC has been taking 
some activities in the landscape area with the help of donor agencies and NGOs. The issues of 
accountability mostly remained upwards especially FD staff feel that they are accountable to 
their upward hierarchy and there is no legal framework or mechanism that have been put into 
place to ensure the downward accountability of FD staff and other government officers to CMC 
or CMOs. 
Bangladesh Forest Department (BFD) is acting as the central authority for preparing master 
plan or policy and responsible for transforming the policy into action with the prior approval 
from Ministry of Environment and Forests (Figure 5). Divisional Forest officer is mainly 
responsible for making administrative and managerial decisions over a specific territory or 
forests under his jurisdiction.  Forest rangers (FR) and beat officers (BO) are the legal field 
level administrative authority who is mainly engaged in the implementation of activity plan in 
protected areas (PAs) according to the instructions given by the Divisional Forest Officer 
(DFO) (Figure 5). Field level FD offices have their own rules and mechanism for reporting 
their activities to the DFO. In the real ground, local level FD staffs (FR and BO) are working 
in the field level and CMC are mainly operating at the community level (Figure 5).  
Forest Ranger (FR) is the member secretary of CMC and other beat officers (BO) are the 
member of CMC. All the CMC members including FD staffs are supposed to be answerable to 
the Co-management Council and Peoples Forum (PF) which will ensure downward 
accountability (Official Gazette Notification, 2010). There should be a balance between both 
upward accountability to higher authority and downward accountability to local people the 
ultimate constituencies.  But in practice, the flow of accountability remains highly upwards and 
there is a vagueness regarding which actor is obliged to whom for their decisions and actions. 
According to official gazette 2010, CMC is accountable to CM council and Peoples Forum 
(PF) and they have to meet at least twice a year. But surprisingly Peoples Forum (PF) doesn’t 
have any legal base yet, it doesn’t have any formal constitutions; there is nothing in the Gazette 
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about its working scope, legal power especially how it can make CMC and other stakeholders 
including Forest Department staffs accountable to their own constituency 
 
 
Figure 5: The Structure of PA governance through Co-Management (CM) system in RKWS 
 
As a consequence, PF and CM council failed to maintain downward accountability and CMC 
also did not bother about this issue. PF is still considered as a passive stakeholder and in 
practice they don’t have the ability, capacity and legal basis to get involved in PA management 
process and make other stakeholders groups accountable to them.  The lack of coordination 
among various stakeholder groups as well as upward accountability of FD to higher authority 
challenges the present structure of institutional arrangements. CMC doesn’t have any right to 
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question, challenge and express approval or disapproval of a Forest departments’ decision and 
actions. Even, CMC needs to take approval or permission from Forest Department for 
implementing their activities in the landscape area of PA. 
Figure (5), demonstrates that, instead of making CMC accountable to local CMOs, lack of 
authoritative power, policy support and inability of enforcing laws made them accountable to 
the higher authority of Forest Department.  On the other hand, FD staffs never shows or never 
tends to show any accountability to local people or Co-management organizations (CMOs) 
because according to Forest act 1927, they are appointed by the government and they are the 
legal custodian of the PA. As a result, they mainly demonstrate compliance with legitimate 
governing laws, policies and legislation and follow their departmental bureaucracy not with 
CMC or local community. This was reflected in a statement given by a forestry official: 
“Actually FD is not accountable to CMC according to law. We normally don’t share our 
internal work and we are not legally bound to share these plans or budgetary information with 
CMC. We have our own criteria and mechanism for monitoring and evaluating the activities 
taken by range offices and we are mainly accountable to Divisional Forest Officer (DFO)”. 
There is a need to develop appropriate mechanism and institutional settings for upward, 
downward and horizontal accountability. There is no proper and clear communication channel 
for the VCF or PF members to maintain regular contact with CMC. The Focus Group 
Discussion with people’s forum (PF) members showed that the majority of the PF members 
don’t have any clear idea about the work of CMC.  In few cases PF-VCF members were 
consulted, but FD or CMC are not obliged to take into account PF or VCF members’ opinions 
and perceptions in decision making process. So there is no downward shift of authority and 
this colonial mentality has put devolution at risk.   
For example, according to CMC president “CMC is simply a powerless puppet? For example, 
Forest Ranger (FR) is the member secretary of CMC but he is accountable to DFO; he never 
thinks that he is answerable to me or CMC? FD staffs always thinks that they are wholly 
answerable to their higher authority, who the hell is CMC? CMC president. 
The lack of proper mechanism of accountability has created the risk of abusing power both 
from the side of FD and elite CMC members. So, the present framework of CM governance 
has failed to allocate more control to higher level of local organizations and the lack of 
administrative and legislative mechanisms and fragile conditions of institutional arrangements 
of CMOs have resulted in a weak governance reform. 
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4.4: Inter-dependency towards a Meaningful Partnership  
The key respondents interviews and FGD revealed that FD staff and local people have 
conflicting interests, different expectation and perception about devolution process (Table 5). 
The government hasn’t placed special attention on promoting meaningful and effective 
partnerships between FD and local community.  Still majority of the FD staff consider CM as 
a donor driven management system because it was initiated and developed under the strong 
influence of a donor funded project. They also perceive this governance reform as a threat to 
their autonomy. All the CMC members and FGD participants were united in their views that 
Forest Department is not dependent on CMC for making and implementing decisions about 
protected area (PA).   
On the other hand, CMC had to inform everything and don’t have the power to take any projects 
or activities without the prior approval or permission from FD. They also emphasized that FD 
don’t perceive CMC/Community as a partner in forest management, but rather as an associate 
organization for helping them in forest conservation. There is a clear lack of interdependency 
and unequal power relations which has placed a barrier for creating meaningful partnerships 
between FD and local community. One of the CMC members sharing his feelings “CMC or 
CREL can’t take any projects without discussing with FD but they don’t share and don’t want 
to share any information about their ongoing work in PA. They are totally independent and 
still hold the legal power for managing PA.” On the other hand, one of the FD staff stated 
“CMC has no legal rights to ask about our departmental and administrative activities and we 
are not accountable to them. We normally don’t share our internal work and we are not legally 
bound to share these plans or budgetary information with CMC’.  
Table 6: Conflicting Interests between FD and Local Community 
Forest Department Community 
Mostly Concerned about Forest protection 
and Biodiversity Conservation 
Mostly concerned about Livelihoods and 
power sharing 
Don’t intend to share Authoritative and 
Managerial Power 
CMC wants more authority and decision 
making power 
Not accountable to CMO, Follow Acts and 
legal procedure 
FD should also be accountable to CMC 
Take decision independently, enjoy more 
autonomy 
Need more equal interdependency and 
coordination, joint decision making 
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No fund or logistic support for CMC or CPG Need permanent financial support from FD 
Not interested or bound to share their 
activities with CMO 
FD should include CMC in their 
departmental activities regarding PA 
CMC should stay outside of PA CMC needs power to work inside PA 
Not interested in sharing Management 
responsibilities 
All the PA management responsibilities 
should be shared equally 
Not interested in giving resource sharing or 
using rights  
FD should allocate some lands or water 
bodies to CMO for creating alternative 
income 
Not interested in sharing ownership and 
legislative power  
CMC should have legislate power and legal 
support backed up by national policies 
 
Another key respondents and CMC members stated: “It seems that FD staffs are in a dilemma; 
they can neither accept us as their partner nor deny us. The power that was resides with the 
Forest Department still resides with them but in a different form. As a CMC member I can’t 
say it directly but it’s like an open secret that FD staffs rarely wants that CMC should sustain 
and become an independent organization”.   
Still NGO’s or CREL project played an important facilitating and capacity building role in 
RKWS. The project staffs are trying to bring local people and FD together under a common 
platform in order to ensure joint management and equitable power sharing. One of the key 
goals of co-management governance is to create meaningful lost lasting partnership among 
different stakeholders. Since devolution itself is challenging for the bureaucracy as it entails 
giving up power so there should be a genuine commitment from both parties to develop a 
meaningful partnership.  Unfortunately, FD staff is focusing on retaining their command and 
control approach and exercising various types of power independently. Moreover, the 
ownership of CMC by government agency is still remains a critical question that is rightly 
reflected in the following statement of a FD personal:  
“If we include community members in our administrative and managerial activities it will 
totally destroy the forest. They should stay outside of our internal affairs. They can help us 
according to the regulation but there is no pint of sharing regulatory and authoritative power 
with CMC. All legal power should be in the hands of FD, and CMC only can perform some 
activities outside of core zone in prior consultation and permission with FD” (Interview 
Transcript FD_BO_002, See Appendix A).  
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FD needs to deal with issues related to co-management partnerships in a more meaningful way 
and there should be a clear legal framework on how CMC and FD will jointly manage and 
monitor all the activities of PA.  In addition to this, there is also a lack of co-ordination exist 
among CMO organizations. FGD results showed that, members of Peoples Forum (PF) and 
Village conservation Forum (VCF) don’t know that much about the activities of CMC and 
there is a lack of proper communication channel among various stakeholders groups. The 
decisions and information’s about CM activities need to be distributed in the lower tier 
institutions of governance structure in order to ensure transparency.  
4.5: Capability of Actors and Livelihood benefits: The majority of the Key 
respondents and FGD participants reported that local community members have very limited 
capacity to organize and manage the CM activities. They also described that without the active 
support from donor supported CREL project they won’t be able to carry out the managerial and 
operational activities of CMC. Because most of the CMO members are illiterate and they are 
clearly lacking in leadership, communication and organizational skills. Now, CREL project is 
assisting CMC to prepare the management plan, organize monthly meetings and capacity 
building training, providing funds, negotiating with the government for formulating policies in 
favor of the CMC. Though, co-management regime has been operating in RKWS since 2004 
(almost more than 10 years) but still, the majority of the community actors are confused about 
the co-management governance process, and are not yet capable enough to carry out their 
activities independently. Even forest department staffs are not properly oriented about 
government gazette and other legal aspects of co-management process.  
Moreover, there is also a lack of interest among community members regarding CM process 
and most of them don’t own it as their responsibilities. Some of them feel like if they engage 
with CM activities they might get some power, social status or benefits in future. Moreover, 
funding from donor agencies still remains critical in facilitation of devolution process. There 
is no proper logistical support available for field level FD staffs and they don’t have arms, 
proper budget, skills and manpower to carry out their routine activities properly. Actually forest 
department (FD) hasn’t got any financial policies for CMOs, and CMC is mainly taking their 
activities and managing its operational cost with the financial support from donor agency. Thus, 
CMC has no permanent source of income and there is no regular inflow of money. Key 
respondents and FGD participants identified this issue as one of the main key challenges. Since 
there is no benefit sharing arrangements between FD and CMC, so CMC is wholly dependent 
on donor funded projects. 
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Co-management is supposed to provide some incentives and livelihoods benefits for the 
engaged stakeholders. But unfortunately no notable progress has been made so far to improve 
the socio-economic condition of local community. CMC has initiated some projects, provided 
support to some families and arranged capacity building and livelihood related training with 
the direct help of CREL project, but this is still very negligible. There is no fund from the 
government, and Forest department has no plan or project for reducing the dependency of 
resource users on forest. Both key respondents and FGD participants identified this aspect as a 
crucial component for the sustainability of CMC.  One of the key respondents from community 
patrolling group was sharing his frustration as follows:  
Forest department has thousands hectares of fallow land and unused water bodies which can 
be used or given to the CMC, CPG or community for creating alternative income sources but 
they didn’t take any steps.  
Another FGD participant was sharing his feelings about livelihood crisis:  “We are really tired 
of doing the same things and making the same false promises to our local members again and 
again over the years (FGD_PF_002)”. Forest department officials also agreed that they didn’t 
have the scope to provide any livelihoods support and Forest department should come forward 
to create livelihood opportunities for the CMO members mainly CPG. One of the Forest officer 
stated “Personally I think FD should create some fund or project for CPG, because they are 
helping in forest conservation almost voluntarily.”  
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Chapter Five: Result and Discussion 
The co-management program at the study site has established new local institutions and 
theoretically engaged various stakeholders group in decision making process. But their 
participations are mostly limited in forest protection and awareness building activities. Though 
CM approach has made a good progress in improving the rivalry relationship and created a 
platform for mutual communication but the active involvement of local community in planning, 
design and decision making process is still far beyond the expectation. Majority of the actors 
still don’t have any clear idea about their actual roles and responsibilities and they perceive co-
management as a way of helping the forest department in forest protection. Our result indicates 
that CM process is not well understood by the actors. They perceive an imbalance of power 
and there is a lack of equitable and locally appropriated decision making process. Several 
reasons may be brought forward to explain this situation and in this chapter we will discuss our 
findings in details through using theoretical lens and link it to relevant literature. 
5.1: Power devolution in CM Governance:  Agrawal and Ribot’s (1999) Actor-Power-
Accountability framework and power typology (Legislative, Executive and Judicial) was used 
to analyze the present power dynamics of CM governance at study site. The findings of the 
study shows that there has been no fundamental shift in unequal power relations, and 
governance reform has been happening in RKWS without insufficient power transfer and 
inappropriate local institutional arrangements. The present paradigm shift in governance in 
RKWS shows that there is a large gap between the rhetorical claims for collaborative 
management and the devolution of power through institutional changes that actually take place 
in real ground. In Bangladesh, forest department is still not enthusiastically committed to adapt 
CM approach and still forest department has retained significant control over PA. 
5.1.1: Power to create rules and make decisions:  Institution defines rules and practices; 
the scope of the authority and their relationships to other state and non-state actors (Singleton, 
2000). So, independent institutions are key to ensure transparency, accountability and equity 
in power sharing process. Our results reveal that co-management institutions in RKWS are 
actually being operated under the shadow of states centralized traditional governance structure 
and CMC or other CMOs have no legal power to make new rules, guidelines or bylaws even if 
they are not compatible with the interest of actors and social-political context of the PA. 
Though field level FD staff appreciate the support of CM organizations in forest protection but 
they are united in their views that all the legal power should be in the hand of forest department 
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(FD). The state agency in Bangladesh is still not eager to share their authoritative power with 
newly formed co-management organizations (CMOs). So, in practice CMC or local community 
has no legislative power and this one way of making regulation made them feel powerless and 
being out of the rules of the game. This sense of powerlessness could be related with the 
findings of Lachapelle et el (2004, p.4), who stated “a lack of power in one area (e.g., rule 
creation) often meant power couldn’t be exercised in another (e.g., dispute adjudication).  
Co-management projects in the protected area (PA) of Bangladesh are mainly operating under 
the official gazette notification 2010. But some aspects of Forest Act 1927 and Wildlife Act 
2012 contradicts with the gazette and FD staffs feel more comfortable with following the act 
rather that CM gazette. For example, according to Wildlife Preservation and Conservation Act 
2012, “no person is allowed to enter inside the PA and cultivate any land in wildlife 
sanctuary”; on the contrary according to CM gazette 2010, CMC can make plan and take 
initiatives inside the PA or landscape zone for creating alternative income sources by 
considering bio-physical condition of PA.  These conflicting clause and guidelines pose serious 
threats for CMC and CMOs to create and implement any plan independently and limiting the 
exercise of their authoritative and managerial power over PA.  As we stated in our result section 
that in RKWS, CMC has made few project plan with the help of donor agency (CREL Project) 
for creating some alternative income sources through fish culture inside the PA but FD has 
denied to give them permission as everything is prohibited inside the PA according to law. 
Similar incidents have been witnessed in Vietnam where local fisheries associations (FAs) are 
not allowed to create new rules that go beyond the rules of state and the power of Fisheries 
Associations (FAs) is limited by the provincial government’s power (Ho et el, 2015).  
Moreover, it’s quite surprising that FD staff feel neither the pressure to include local actors in 
decision making process nor to incorporate their needs and preferences. Actually, our results 
found that, CMC and other CMOs are suffering from legitimacy deficits.  According to 
Lockwood (2010) government agencies are legitimized through the democratic authority 
vested in governments to authorize decisions and actions and delegate responsibilities to 
agency officials. Therefore, FD staff think they are the only legitimized agency since they are 
legally entitled with authoritative power by law and they don’t perceive CMC as a legitimized 
authority because it is not yet backed up by constitution, laws or policies. Lockwood (2010) 
also mentioned that an organization can also earn legitimacy for more specific responsibilities 
and actions by gaining approval directly from the people affected. On one hand, CMC doesn’t 
have any legitimacy by legal law or policy and on the other hand they are also struggling to 
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deliver expected outcomes due to resource deficits, inadequate decision making power and 
improper communication with other local actors which collectively creates barrier for CMC to 
earn legitimacy from the local community.    
Additionally, our findings suggest that membership criteria for CMC needs to be revised but 
CMC can’t make any decision on this issue. Seid-Green, (2014) claimed that involvement of 
various actors is supposed to reflect better public values but maximum participation may not 
always bring positive outcomes because if the representatives or actors are not strongly 
downwardly accountable to the rest of the community it is likely to become a source of misuse 
and abuse (Ribot 2001; Campbell and Shackleton 2002).  So, instead of including as many as 
actors in the CM arrangements it is much more important to identify the most relevant actors 
and put a mechanism in place to engage them actively in management activities and make them 
responsive and accountable to the local institutions such as CMC or people forum (PF).   
Moreover, our result also find that, there is an absence of clear legal framework for local level 
co-management organizations (CMOs) such as PF, CPG, YC and VCFs. The government 
gazette notification didn’t specify what types of power is decentralized and merely spelled out 
the roles that these different actors should play in the CM arrangements. In addition, there is 
no proper instruction about the inclusion and exclusion criteria for selecting member in various 
CMOs expect CMC or CM council. In In India, JFM programme was introduced through 
administrative orders rather than changes to the law which has been found a major constraint 
in securing resource users rights, creating legal partnership between government and local 
communities and often lead to confusion among stakeholders regarding their roles and 
responsibilities (Springate-Baginski and Blaikie, 2007). Similarly, Larson (2002) argues that 
legal ambiguities create obstacles for local organizations or stakeholder groups to act properly 
because it may be taken to task for having undertaken an illegal action. Thus, in our case 
ambiguity and vagueness regarding rights and responsibilities coupled with insufficient legal 
organizational support create complexities and confusion among actors which undermines the 
degree of devolution sought through CM.  
5.1.2: Power to implement decisions and ensure compliance: According to Agrawal 
and Ribot (1999), effective decentralization only takes place when local community or actors 
have the power to make and enforce decisions and rules independently. Our study finds that, 
in RKWS, CMC has been endowed with very limited authoritative power to make decision 
about developing long term management plan for PA and executing the plan accordingly. In 
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theory they can prepare a project plan but in practice they don’t have any power to execute or 
implement the plan until it is approved by DFO and they can only operate their activities in 
landscape area and in some cases inside buffer zone. Our result shows that CMC literally have 
no activities inside the PA and in practice very limited management responsibilities have been 
transferred to local authority/CMOs.  In RKWS, devolution has been taking place without 
giving sufficient authority to exercise decision-making powers and adequate controls over 
forest management and without any proper incentive structure or benefit sharing mechanism.  
Therefore, CM governance is struggling to yield desirable outcomes especially for local 
livelihoods and it has reproduced asymmetrical power relation.  
KimDung et al, (2016) observe that, unequal division of political and fiscal control by the state 
limited the power of actors to contribute in day-to-day management activities of PA. Our result 
finds that in RKWS, government and state agency still determines the nature of responsibilities 
and powers to devolve and no considerable management responsibility has been transferred to 
local authority or CMOs so far. Overall decision making power is still concentrated within the 
FD, they are totally responsible for everyday management of the forest and the only input from 
CMOs is to support them in forest patrolling, controlling illegal hunting and creating awareness 
among local forest dwellers. Moreover, Shackeloton et al (2002) found that, in joint 
management income distribution shares are mostly decided at the central level, and Bazaara, 
(2003) and Fairhead & Leach (1996) also concluded that central governments rarely give up 
control over the allocation of profitable revenue sharing opportunities. Our study also finds the 
similar results and CMOs don’t get any percentage from revenue collected by selling logs 
seized by community patrolling group (CPG) and there is no clear mechanism for sharing of 
benefit from joint management. So in practice CMC and CMOs don’t have any ownerships and 
resource using rights as well as don’t possess any power to create rules for benefit sharing.  
However, we also found that some informal executive power has been transferred to CMC, 
especially to some extent, CMC can apply sanction to those who do not comply with guidelines 
or violate the CM rules. But CMC can only execute this power over community members and 
CMC or CMOs don’t have any power to enforce compliance against FD or other government 
actors. Case studies from Niger, Zambia and Cameron show that co-management policies were 
either not accompanied with necessary legal frameworks or such legal supporting mechanisms 
were effectively blocked from being used (Bene et al, 2009). In our case, though CMC has got 
some executive power but their implementation has been impeded by creating many obstacles. 
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Especially the institutional structure of forest department and vagueness in the CM gazette 
about how to ensure compliance with rules and how to sanction offenders has limited the power 
of CMC to enforce executive power. This can be related with the findings of Chinangwa et el, 
(2015), who stated that “the introduction of new institutions may threaten those who are 
already in power”.  Still there is an invisible fear among the FD staff that the transfer of 
executive power may weaken the centralized governance structure and will create new 
windows of opportunity for other actors which will reshape the institutional arrangements and 
lessen the authoritative power they have been enjoying so far.  
5.1.3: Power to resolve conflicts: Despite of having massive limitations in RKWS, CMC is 
playing a vital role in resolving resource related conflict at community level. Though there is 
no formal frameworks or conflict resolution mechanisms exist but engaging different actors in 
conflict resolution process have made a positive change and created considerable trust among 
local actors. But still CMOs have no formal judicial power and can’t play any role in resolving 
land use, land tenure-ship and land encroachment related conflicts. Decentralization reforms 
also produce disputes over benefit sharing and Cinner et al (2012) stated that in some instances 
conflicts can lead to adaptations in legislation or guidelines. This is somehow true in our case, 
for example in our study site selection of beneficiary for social forestry scheme has proved a 
highly contentious issues and local actors also reported the issue of elite capture and they were 
demanding a change in the process.  In order to resolve this conflict appropriately CMC has 
decided that FD has to select the beneficiary with prior consultation with CMC, which is 
perceived as a positive change by local community. 
A wide range of studies conducted in Asia, Africa and Latina America revealed that almost all 
cases of devolution have been unsuccessful because state agencies have failed to transfer 
sufficient rights and responsibilities over natural resources to the community members or 
stakeholders (Chinangwa et el 2015, Pulhin and Dressler 2009; Shackleton et al. 2002; Ribot 
et el. 2006 and Matose, 2006). Even in the context of decentralization initiatives the outcomes 
of present governance reform in RKWS is not systematically positive in terms of sharing of 
decision making power and management responsibility. No significant rights or power have 
been entitled to CMOs and this co-management structure gives local actors or community 
member’s very limited space and bargaining power for negotiation with the policy makers. It 
seems that the history of highly centralized state management of forest for more than a century 
in our country is still deeply rooted in the state’s agency which created barriers for the CMOs. 
Therefore, CMC failed to play a fundamental role in shaping the distribution of benefit due to 
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inadequate legal support. Moreover, there is very limited scope for the local actors to engage 
in and influence policy level and this systematically organized forest bureaucracy is actually 
recentralizing the power of state in a modified way.  
5.2: Accountability: Our result implies that the present institutional arrangements and 
governance structure are not fully favorable for the active participation of actors and influence 
the outcomes of the process. Agrawal and Ribot, (1999) concluded that the expected benefits 
of decentralization become available to local community only when empowered local actors 
are downwardly accountable. In RKWS, it is evident that accountability remains mostly 
vertical and there is no clear legal support and guidelines on how to ensure downward 
accountability. According to Ribot et el., (2006), if local governments or institutions always 
must seek approval from superiors before undertaking an action, their downward accountability 
and ability to respond are weakened. In practice, there is very limited transfer of managerial 
and authoritative power from Forest department to co-management organizations (CMOs) and 
CMC always need to seek permission before taking any projects in the buffer zone or landscape 
area of PA. As a result community inputs are severely diluted due to the lack of proper 
accountability mechanisms.  Decision making process are mostly controlled by the Forest 
Department and there is a lack of visibility and transparency regarding the decision taken by 
them about protected area (PA) management. Besides this, local elite sometimes allies with 
corrupted FD personnel for their benefits which also shape the outcome of governance process.  
Moreover, formation of CMC through electing or selecting representatives from various 
stakeholder groups is supposed to ensure downward accountability but irregular election and 
lack of clearly defined mechanisms to make them accountable to their constituents has created 
frustrations among community members. Additionally, Ribot et el., (2006) concluded that, a 
full sense of accountability will emerge only as elections become institutionalized.  In my study 
site, the period of present co-management committee (CMC) has expired two years ago but no 
new election has been organized so far for the formulation of new committee. CMC is supposed 
to accountable to PF and CM council but majority of the PF and CM council members are 
mostly unaware about their rights and they are not properly informed about the regular 
activities of CMC. If local populations or stakeholders are unaware about their rights and don’t 
get proper information, this can make a mockery of accountability even where local leaders are 
democratically elected (Ribot et el., 2006). Agrawal and Ribot (1999, p.478) mentioned that 
“if powers are decentralized to actors who are not accountable to their constituents, or who 
are accountable only to themselves or to superior authorities within the structure of the 
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government, then decentralization is not likely to accomplish its stated aims.” Our results 
reveals that Forest Department and government officials who were mainly appointed by 
government according to gazette are totally ignorant about their role as a CMC members and 
are likely to be loyal to their government office instead of their constituents or local people. 
Thus, the existing accountability mechanism indicates that forest department limits the scope 
of reforms in order to ensure that outcomes of reforms will not threaten their existing autonomy. 
5.3: Partnership Arrangements and Interdependency:  As we know that co-management 
(CM) engages two separate but interrelated parties in resource management (KimDung et el, 
2016) in order to overcome the shortcoming of centralized management and creating 
partnership arrangements between state and community. But our results indicates that there is 
a clear lack of interdependency between FD and CMC regarding taking decisions and 
managing PA. Central to collaborative interaction are issues of inclusion, power-sharing and 
joint decision-making (Davidson-Hunt & O’Flaherty 2007). In RKWS,  FD is not dependent 
on CMC for taking or implementing any decision or plan in PA. Moreover, FD is actively 
involved in all activities taken by CMC with the assistance of donor projects but CMC or CMOs 
have no involvement in the departmental activities of FD. FD don’t share their activities, 
budgetary information or audit report with CMC and our results show that local actors perceive 
it as a hindrance to ensure transparency.  It seems like that one set of actors are likely to have 
a considerable influence on all the decision making process regarding PA management which 
makes cooperation difficult.  
Co-management involves social actors at multiple levels and from different social groups and 
this cross-scale arrangements are expected to lead to network relationships and multilevel 
governance (Basurto, 2013; Berkes, 2007; Paavola, 2007). Though, social trust and change in 
attitudes of FD staffs towards community has created opportunity for collective action but 
inadequate formal scope for local actors to engage actively in all types of forest management 
activities is impeding the success of devolution process in RKWS.  Possible consequences of 
this asymmetrical power relation could threaten the process of joint management and limits the 
opportunity for creating genuine multi-level partnership among various actors. In order to bring 
about successful collaboration, the state must cultivate social trust, and demonstrate the 
capacity and willingness to be tough, credible and reliable (Singleton, 2000). Social trust and 
interdependency and sense of ownership is a necessary condition for an institution to function 
effectively which is not really present in the study site. Mutual cooperation would allow each 
side to focus on the task for which it has a comparative advantage while enjoying the benefits 
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of collaboration (Singleton, 2000). The interdependency and collaboration among various 
actors could be fostered through creating scope for constructive dialogues, maintaining diverse 
social relationships network, building trust and competency through learning by doing and all 
these factors can lead to a more informed understanding of CM which will ensure the long term 
sustainability of CM institutions. 
5.4: Capability of Actors:  Successful co-management requires investing in institutions and 
building leadership capacity at local levels (Evans et al, 2011). Our results show that, local 
actors don’t possess enough technical skills and knowledge about forest policies, CM gazette, 
rights and responsibilities to maintain the regular activities of CM process without the direct 
support of NGO staffs.  Donor agencies still played an important role in strengthening the 
capacity of actors and state has literally no financial and technical support for CM system. 
Institutional and capacity building is necessary at both government and resource user levels for 
multi-level co-management to be effective (Mansuri and Rao, 2004). Even local level FD office 
don’t have enough staff, proper budget, skills and manpower to carry out their routine activities 
and they also don’t have proper knowledge about CM process. Larson, (2002) and Ribot et al, 
(2006), summarized that the devolution of management responsibilities without corresponding 
funds to carry them out is common a strategy of state. Though state has introduced CM in PA 
but they don’t provide any direct fund or financial support for the CMC or CMOs.  Ribot et al., 
(2006) also mentioned that unfunded mandates reduce the ability of local actors or 
organizations to undertake any management tasks and this is also common in RKWS. 
Therefore, there is a need for identifying possible funding mechanisms that will empower 
communities to participate in decision making independently and continue the co-management 
program without donor support.   
Moreover, our results also summarize that limited participation of ordinary community 
members such as of general members of Peoples Forum, CM Council, VCF member and  Youth 
Club in capacity building training program coupled with low literacy level, further limits their 
capacity to effectively engage in decision making process. CMC is not essentially providing 
enough financial and technical support to make other CMOs (PF, YC, VCF and CPG) 
independent. As a consequence, we found that ordinary members of PF and VCF members 
merely have any idea about the CM process, activities and outcomes and this drastically limits 
their capacity to engage in the CM process. Singleton (2000), suggests that actors must have 
the capability, the social and material resources to solve the variety of collective action 
problems associated with creating and maintaining resource management institutions. In our 
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case, still CMOs have to rely on donor agencies for financial and technical support and state 
agencies for enforcing rules which is creating barriers to the sustainability of CM process. 
Agrawal and Ribot (1999) stated that power in a co-management program should be devolved 
to coordinated and capable institutions and actors. On the other hand, Berkes (2010) argue that 
co-management is actually a learning by doing process and actors can be empowered and 
capable when they engage in management activities. So, if actors are given the scope to 
exercise their power in practice they will eventually become competent and skilled. 
Awareness of their rights amongst stakeholders and knowledge of the constitution are critical 
factors influencing devolution outcomes (Shackleton et el, 2002). Our results show that despite 
of having various constrains the process of shared governance has provided some positive 
outcomes. These changes were possible due to the leadership capacity, commitment and 
substantial knowledge of CMC president in RKWS. Mutual cooperation and successful 
cooperation are obviously more likely to emerge and be sustained when both sides have the 
adequate resource to carry out their agreed responsibilities (Singleton 2000). So, improving 
actor’s capacity is hence very essential and state agencies must demonstrate that it is committed 
to genuine co-management through providing legislative, technical and financial support for 
local capacity building.  
Livelihood enhancement and welfare of the community is an important goal in resource 
management (Singeleton, 2000). Present decentralization process through CM activities hasn’t 
significantly increased the tangible economic benefits for local people, except few CPG 
members that were included in the social forestry scheme and few VCF members got livelihood 
related training by CREL which is really negligible. But, still there is a lack of access for CMOs 
to sufficient financial resources and there is no livelihood support for the local resource 
dependent community from Forest Department. Singleton (2000) recommended that the state 
should provide subsidies that compensate locals for preserving biodiversity and Shackleton et 
al (2002) also concluded that failures to deliver promised share of income or incentives in CM 
severely affects local enthusiasm. Similar phenomena have been observed in our case as local 
actors are not getting any proper incentives, and unequal trade-off between FD and community 
is affecting the active participation of local actors. Therefore, co-management needs to focus 
on positive trade-offs between state and community through reconciling multiple values and 
goals of various actors in order to accelerate the success of devolution process.  
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5.5: Factors affecting the process of co-management governance at RKWS  
Our study implies that different actors placed different values on forest resources and 
sometimes they have competing 
interests. Thus there are divergence 
and contrasts regarding the 
perception of various actors about 
co-management process and 
outcomes. Findings from the key 
respondents’ interview, FGD, 
secondary materials and subsequent 
discussion have found several major 
factors that are creating hindrance 
for successful implementation of 
co-management program which 
are described in the Figure 6. Our 
study finds that local people don’t 
have that much scope to play active role in decision making process due to the imbalance of 
power and complex centralized nature of forest bureaucracy. Thus, the majority of respondents 
perceived this governance reform as a modified and more systematic way of retaining state 
control over forest protected areas (PA). In summary, the lack of legal policy support, improper 
institutional arrangements and governance structure, limited transfer of managerial power and 
authoritative power, vertical accountability mechanism, lack of access for CMOs to sufficient 
financial resources, insufficient livelihood support, lack of interdependency between FD and 
CMC regarding taking decision and managing protected area (PA) and  insufficient skills and 
knowledge of actors are the key factors affecting the successful implementation of co-
management project in RKWS. 
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Chapter Six: Conclusion and Recommendations 
The objective of the study was to assess whether co-management program has managed to 
achieve power devolution to some extent and how well is collaborative governance functioning 
in practice.  Our  results  reveals  that,  present  CM  arrangements  at  study  site  has  not  been 
successful  in  restructuring  the  asymmetrical  power  relations.  Moreover,  the  differences  
in perceived understanding among actors  about CM  system  also reflects  the complexities 
involved in  devolution  process  and  indicates  the  need  for  incorporating  multiple  interests  
and perspectives in the CM program  in order to achieve desired outcomes.  This study shows 
that the transfer of power actually determines the outcomes of CM governance reform and state 
agency deploys various strategy to reinforce the unequal power relation by creating legal 
barriers or blocking the power being used by local organizations. Moreover, this study also 
reveals the complexity  associated  with  CM  governance  reform  process  and  how  one  set  
of  actors  can manipulate or control the whole process if there is no uniform or equal 
distribution of decision making power and proper institutional arrangements and downward 
accountability mechanism. Thus,  the  findings  of  our  research  highlights  the  importance  
of  critically  examining  the effectiveness of co-management system from the perspectives of 
power devolution and this study might also be useful to understand why the CM process is 
struggling to deliver the expected outcomes in other PA of Bangladesh as well. 
Transferring  or  sharing  of  power  is  the  vital  factor  that  determines  the  effectiveness  
and sustainability  of  CM  governance  reform.  Because,  the  nature  of  power  relations  
ultimately determines the nature of co-operation among various actors and unequal distribution 
of power also  affects  negatively the capacity  building  process.  Moreover, our study also 
conclude that, vagueness in policy documents and improper legal policy support may create a 
power vacuum and  government  agency  can  use  this  vacuum  as  a  way  of  manipulating  
the  process  of  CM governance and make powerless actors to be accountable to state rules or 
institution instead of  their  constituency.  A  genuine  governance  reform  through  CM  process  
needs  genuine commitment from both  state and community and a stable and suitable  power 
transition process. Thus,  our  findings  argue  that  the  rhetorical  claim  of  success  of  CM  
process  is  not  always  represent the reality and asymmetrical power relation remains central 
to the CM process which hindering the success of CM governance process in a 
multidimensional way.   
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The governance reform in RKWS thorough co-management program has shown some positive 
changes  particularly  in  the  field  of  forest  protection,  reducing  corruption,  improving  
social relations and minimizing resource related conflicts. However, CM is still struggling to 
achieve true devolution due to insufficient power transfer, inappropriate legal policy support, 
lack of capability of actors and upward accountability mechanisms. Despite of various 
limitations this approach has played an important role in overcoming the stage of historic 
mistrust between state and community and established a common platform for joint 
management which was not previously present.  Good  leadership  skill  of  the  CMC  president,  
commitment  among  CMC members,  active  support  from  CREL  project  and  a  change  in  
attitude  of  FD  staffs  towards community were the key factors found to be facilitate co-
management process at study site.  
Though, FD has recognized the importance of community involvement in forest protection but 
they  are  not  willing  to  share  authoritative  and  managerial  power  with  co-management 
organisations (CMOs).  As  stated  by Sandstorm and Rova (2010), collaboration among actors 
is mainly determined by the relative power  and  allocative  authority  of  each  actor,  which  
regulates  strategic  interactions  among actors. The situation in RKWS implies that, unequal 
power relation creates unequal degree of interdependency  which  in  turn  limiting  the  capacity  
of  CMOs  to  establish  meaningful collaboration with FD or state. Moreover, forest department 
merely share their operational plan or budget with CMC  or  CMOs  regarding  protected  area  
which  might  compromise  the  transparency  and visibility of decision making process. 
Singleton (2000) propose that, in order to achieve successful co-management (CM), the state 
should facilitate cooperation between parties, supplying stable rules and acting as a third party 
enforcer of such rules. Unfortunately, these enabling conditions are found absent in our study 
site and it seems that CM is operating as a foster child of government. Findings of the KimDung 
et el, (2013) suggest that, in many cases, co-management remains mostly administrative rather 
than participative in nature. This is somewhat true in our case because our study also indicates 
that there is an inherent tendency of government to retain control over forests and there is a 
lack of commitment for developing genuine partnerships. Thus, there is a need to adopt 
cooperative regulatory strategies in order to achieve greater effectiveness of CM process and 
state shouldn’t be  simply  act  as  a  rule  enforcer  instead  they  should  come  forward  to  
nurture  meaningful partnerships through incorporating broader public interests in their policy. 
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Moreover, mechanisms of upward accountability have further weakened the success of CM 
process as FD and other government stakeholders tend to account to legislative government 
agencies rather than to local communities or CMOs. As Ribot (2002) stated that “establishing 
accountable representation without powers is empty.’ Limited capacity and power of local actor 
and  improper  legal  support  and  institutional  arrangements  in  decentralized  frameworks  
has failed  to  ensure  downward  accountability.  Thus public hearing, public auditing, joint 
monitoring and evaluation as well as fair and regular electoral process for CMC or CMOs and 
increased local awareness could be used as a strategy to address this problem.  
Furthermore,  there  is  no  proper  mechanism  for  sharing  revenue  or  benefit  from  joint 
management  and  the  present  CM  arrangements  have  not  been  successful  to  meet  the 
local livelihood  needs.  In  addition  to  this,  lack  of  education  and  skills,  limited  knowledge  
with regards to roles and responsibilities, and insufficient technical and financial support from 
state for local actors  limits their capacity to effectively implement the management activities 
and make decisions autonomously. Shackleton et al., (2002) pointed that supporting local 
capacity building and livelihood enhancement should be the centre to devolution policies. Our 
results also support that capable local actors can influence the CM process positively and 
considerable effort should be given to empower relevant local actors. Moreover, Sessin-
Dilascio et al, (2015) emphasize that a successful co-management process requires ongoing 
investment. Though our results shows that there is a positive change in forest protection, social 
relation  and  conflict resolution;  this  however  may  not  guarantee  that  present  CM  
arrangements  will  continue  to display these  outcomes and ensure long term sustainability of 
CM process. Especially, when there will be no donor support or technical input from NGOs 
and when there will be no dynamic and potential person like present CMC president.  
As Sidaway (2005) stated “Politics of cooperation is only possible when politics of power have 
been exhausted”.  So,  forest  department  needs  to  shift  their  position  from  the  centralized 
regulatory  behaviour  towards  more  equitable  democratic  power  sharing  process  in  order  
to facilitate meaningful partnerships between state and community. Considering the present 
socioeconomic  and  political  condition  central  government  may  continue  to  contribute  to 
enforcement, monitoring and administrate protected area (PA). But at least they should transfer 
some  degree  of  management  rights  and  decision-making  powers  to  CMC.  In addition, 
FD should engage CMO members in day to day management activities and allocate some 
fallow forest land to CMOs for creating alternative income sources which in turn will increase 
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their capabilities, confidence and financial autonomy as well as inspire and make them feel as 
a partner rather than an implementer or passive actor.  
Though present CM has shown the potential to provide positive outcomes but Chinangwa et 
al, (2015), concluded that, failure to abolish the power imbalance and to transfer decision 
making and  management  powers  from  state  to  local  institutions,  could  in  practice  mean  
that  co-management is just management in disguise. In terms of power devolution and 
transformation towards cooperative partnerships and multi-level governance present CM 
system is really far away from achieving these goals.  Therefore, increasing trust and mutual 
interdependency, creating enabling policy and providing technical and financial support for 
both CMOs and local level FD staffs should be the priority for government as it could increase 
the likelihood towards arriving at more equitable and collaborative power sharing process.  
Our study also finds that CM is not a universal panacea and doesn’t offer in built simplistic 
solutions for all governance related problems.  Because, every social-ecological system is 
unique in terms of the actor, power relation, history, culture and geography that influence the 
perceived understanding of actors. Thus, outcomes of the governance reform process through 
CM  depend  on  how  different  actors  interact  and  collaborate  within  this  complex  social-
ecological  system.  So,  a  more  intensive  further  research  is  also  needed  to  understand  
the political, ecological and social context within which the co-management system is currently 
being operated. In addition to this, identifying the context specific enabling conditions is also 
necessary for creating a unified understanding and vision of shared governance. In order to 
ensure the effectiveness of devolved governance system, the present power sharing dynamics 
needs to be restructured in a meaningful way.  As well as, necessary changes in institutional 
arrangements and legislative framework should be made to overcome the limitation of ongoing 
CM process and address the existing gaps between policy and practice. 
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Appendix A: Summary of Semi-structured Interview of Key Informants 
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Management 
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Interview 
Date 
1 Interview Transcript 
FD_FR_MS_001 
Forest 
Department (FD) 
Member 
Secretary 
Range 
Office, 
RKWS 
19-05-2016 
2 Interview Transcript 
FD_BO_002 
Forest 
Department (FD) 
General 
Member 
Beat Office, 
Rema, 
RKWS 
23-05-2016 
3 Interview Transcript 
FD_BO_GM_003 
Forest 
Department (FD) 
General 
Member 
Over Phone 26-07-2016 
 Interview Transcript 
CMC_CS_P_001 
Civil Society (CS) President Over Phone 12-08-2016 
4 Interview Transcript 
CMC_PF_VP_002 
Peoples Forum 
(PF) 
Vice-
President 
(VP) 
Kalanga 
Village 
28-05-2016 
6 Interview Transcript 
CMC_CPG_GM_00
3 
Community 
Patrolling Group 
(CPG) 
General 
Member 
Nalmukh 
Bajar, 
Chunarughat 
06-06-2016 
7 Interview Transcript 
CMC_CPG_GM_00
4 
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Patrolling Group 
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General 
Member 
Rupospur 
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8 Interview Transcript 
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Youth Club (YC) General 
Member 
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Ethnic 
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General 
Member 
Lalkeyar 
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11-06-2016 
10 Interview Transcript 
CMC_FUG_GM_00
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Forest User Group 
(FUGs) 
General 
Member 
Garamchari 
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VCF, EC member 
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